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PREFAOE
Relations between the United states and Germany during the past fifty years have had the unique oharaoteristio of
being violently disrupted by two gigantio world oonflicts r

In

each struggle Amerioans have opposed Germans both ideologically and militarily.

As a result, so muoh attention has been

paid to these times of strife that the peaoeful era of the
1920's has come to be regarded by many as of only secondary tmportanoe.
Historioally speaking, this may be true.

Yet this

does not mean that American intercourse with the Reich during
the period of the Weimar Republio should be ignored or forgot- .
ten.

The years that lay between the demise of 'Kaiser Billa

and the rise of Adolf Hitler were pregnant not only with numer\

ous manifestations of real progress toward a German-American
rapprochement, but were also filled with many indications of
better times to oome.

A study of the Weimar era, then, present,

an interesting oontrast to the unhappy state of affairs in
which the German and American nations found themselves in the
years that both preceded and followed this period.
Finally, if for no other reason than to unoover the
ili

iv
-factors whioh made possible suoh a relationship between the
•

.

Reioh and America, the subjeot of this thesis has had, indeed,
a sufficient warrant for ita undertaking. Oompleted, it leaves
.-many questions yet to be answered, but at the same time, it
approaohes at least one step oloser to a fuller understanding
of the problem at hand.
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OHAPTER I
GERMAN-AMERIO~-BELATIONS

PRIOR TO 1919

American relations with the Weimar Republic, while
they are the primary object of this investigation, are in theml

selves but a small fragment of that greater assooiation whioh
has concerned the United states and Germany during the past
three oenturies.

Oonsequently, in order to place the events

of the early post-World War era in their proper setting, and
thereby to faci11tate an understanding of their role in the
whole of German-American relations, some br1ef account of the
background leading up to this per10d 1s necessary.
At the outset, it might be well to point out that,
prior to the First World War, affairs between Germany and America fell sharply into two well defined phases.

For slightly
\

over a century beginning with the American Revolution, a growing friendship slowly manifested itself between the two nations, but when oommercial and colon1al rivalries emerged upon
the scene in the late 1800's an antagonistio attitude developed
which culminated in the chaos of 1917 and 1918.

This d!vision

might well be kept in mind as the following events are related.
1

a
I.

During the seventeenth oentury. due to the undeveloped nature of both oountries. little intercGUfse of any sort

.

was oarried on between them.

William Penn's exhortation for

Germans to oome to America was probably the only real contact made between the two peoples before the Revolution.

Some

years later, the alliance between the British and Frederick

•

the Great of Prussia was instrumental in practioally eliminating the Frenoh from the Western Hemisphere, a faotor of great
importanoe in the development of the thirteen American colonies
Events in the· 1750's, however, turned the Prussian king against
his ally in such a way that his antagonism to Britain proved to
be a boon to the struggling oolonists after 1775.
American friendship with Prussia;and its ruler never
a8sumed the oharacter of a full-fledged alliance, however. l
Though he weloomed any English misfortune, espeoially of a oommercial nature, Frederiok doubted the ability of the

Ame~ican

•

rabble to deteat the oraok British militia, and since he himself wished to avoid a tangle with the red-coats, he adamantly
clung to his polioy of remaining a "tranquil spectator. p2
Many more times than one did he hold himself aloof from the col
1 Paul Leland Haworth, "Frederiok the Great and the
Revolution," American Historical Review~ New York, The
Macmillan Co., IX, 1904~ passim.
2 Ibid., 463.

~~er1can

I

3

onial agents,

~eane,

Franklin, and Lee, at one time even dub-

bing them as lin too muoh of a hurry with thelr propositions

.

for a formal [oommeroial] negot;iation. n3 He did,' ,however, refuse passage through his dOmains to British meroenaries from
Hesse,4 and in 1777, sent Baron Frederick William von Steuben
to improve the conditi,on of the ragged Amerioan army.

The

Prussian general trained the colonial units so well that
in the military history of our Revolution,
if we olass men aocording to their services,
no one after Washington and [General Nathanael] Greene stands so bigh as Steuben.5
Several other slight ooncessions were accorded to
the colonies in the remaining years of the American Revolution?
but not until England herself had conceded the pOint, did the

,

Prussian government recognize the independenoe of the United
States.

This done, the way was thrown open for the

establis~

I
I

ment of formal oommeroial ties, and thus, within a few years
three treaties, 7 widely aoclaimed as new standards of int'er-

i

3 Ibid., 464. Frederiok to Schulenburg, May 6, 1777.
4 Ibid., 462. Quotes Frederiok's Works, IV, 178.
5 George Washington Greene, The German Element in
the War of American Independenoe, New York, H~·a and Houghton,
llf7'6:B"S:6 Haworth, 470-472.
7 Texts are given in James B. Soott, The Treaties of
'1785, 1799, and 1828 between the United States a~russ1n, -~
- ........---~New York, Oxford University Press,
1918, passim.

\

,
!

i

I
i

-

-

4

national

condu~t,

were oonoluded between the two governments.

Benjamin Franklin,rwho negotiated the first
~785,

o~

these pacts in

so projected his humanitarian outlook that such novel pr

.

visions were included as (.1) the abolition of privateers in cas
of war between the signatories, (2) the purchase, not the confisoation, of oontraband, (3:) the allowance of nine months for
l

the retirement of enemy aliens in case of oonflict between the
adherents, and (4) the oonvoying of eaoh other's ships during a
war in whioh both parties were neutral.
This treaty, whioh further provided for the oondition
al granting of oommeroial favors to Prussia,8 was renewed in
modified form in 1799 and 1828. 9 Beoause of the small volume

0

trade in the early period of German-Amerioan relations, amity
and equality prevailed, although in later years, due to the dif
ferent interpretations given these olauses'by Germany and the
United States, many internat10nal disputes oame to the fore. 10
,
The f1rst half of the nineteenth oentury was a per10d ,
8 George M. Fisk, 'German-Amerioan 'Most-Favored-Nation' Relations,· Journal of Politioal Eoonoml, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, XI, 1903, a20.
9 The negotiations regarding these treaties are covered in Count Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, Germanl and ~ Uni~
ed States of America durin~ the Era of Bismarok, Heading, Pa.,
Henry Janssen Foundation, 1937, 11-1'2; Jesse S. Reeves, liThe
Prusaian-knerican Treaties,n American Journal of International
~, New York, Oxford University Press, XI, 1917, 497-501. 10 Wallace McOlure, "German-.American Conunercial Rela- I
tions," American Journal .2!. International ~, XIX, 1925, 692.

I

5

of expanding Amerioan interoourse, not only with Prussia, but
also with the Hansa towns of Bremen and Hamburg,
. the Zollverein,
and other states independent

of

the toll union.

Trade with the

Hansa oities existed long-before 1800, but due to Napoleon's
oontinental b10okade, Amerioan ships were seen on the Elbe for
the last time before Waterloo in 1808.

After 1815, oommeroe

again so flourished that New York and Philadelphia beoame the
seats of oonsulate-genera1 offioes representing Hamburg and Br
men. l1 Between 1820 and 1827 the volume of German goods coming
into the United States was valued at fourteen million two hundred fifty thousand dollars, and return produots to Europe
reaohed the sum of eighteen million dollars. 12 By 1840, how- ,
ever, due to an eConomic depression and the pre-eminence of internal trade in Amerioa, exports to harbors on the Elbe and Wes
er dropped oonsiderably,13 tobaooo importations, notably by Bre
men, alone oontinuing to be high.

A Zollverein paot in wh1ch
\

the United States agreed to levy no more than twenty per oent
agriculture and industrial produots of the member states in

0

ex-f

change for lowered rates on lard and tobacoo in Germany, was ne
got1ated in 1844, although this was but one of many such treat11
12

Stolberg, 20.
Ibid., 21.

13 Ib1d. Statistioal data given.
der Fruhzeit des Nordatlantik Verkebrs, 13.

Oites W!tjen, Aus

s
made with the several German

states during this period. 14

The revolutionary movements in oentral
. Europe in 1848
and 1849 opened a new channel for German-American relations •
i

For the first time in

th~1r

. history,

the American p,eople as a

whole took an aotive interest in what was going on in German~l

I

I

for they saw there a struggle muoh the same as the one they had
undertaken some seventy years earlier.

Interest was high. be-

cause the promised changes seemed to parallel American demooraoy, because innumerable German-Amerioan voters could not be ignored by aspirants to political office, and finally, as GazleYS
puts it, because the German government "might fill the pocketbooks of Amerioan citizens" through favorable oommeroial ties.
Sharp criticism, however, soon.voioed itself when the expected

,

.

did not happen, so that many Amerioana took the attitude that
the Germans were unfit for liberal institutions l ? or that they
14 Ibid. Oites Fisk, Die Handelspolitischen und 80nstigen volkerrecntlichen Bezeihungen, 89ff;and Webster, {ratings and Speeches, XII, 8bff. See also: Samuel F. Bemis e.)"
American Secretaries of State and their Diplomaoy, New York, A.
Knopf, i9!3lJ, V, 2:34-2'27.
15 R.C. MoGrane, "The American Position on the Revolution of 1848 in Germany,- Historioal Outlook, Philadelphia,
McKinley Publishing Co., XI, 1920, ~~3.
16 John G. Gazley, American Opinion of German Unification: ~-l871, New York, Columbia ~niversity-press, 1926,
32-3~.

17

~.

7

laoked "patien.oe,stability of purpose, and determinatiolll 1n
aooomp11shment of their endS. ala
On the international soene, PruS,s1a was more favored

--.

,

than Austr1a, although Freder10k W1111am IV was muoh d1s11ked
beoause of h1s adherenoeto the od1ous Holy Al11ance. 19

The

Frankfort Assembly, above all, was popularly or1t1c1zed both

•

for 1ts self1shness and impraot1oab1l1ty, and by John O. Oalhoun for 1ts over-oentralization. 20 Oalhoun favored a cont1nuation of the,ex1st1ng

feder~t10n,

though w1th added powers over

fore1gn affa1rs, defense, and enforoement of 1nternal co-operation.

At the same time, however, he felt that the sucoess of

, const1 tut1ona11smJn all Europe depended on. that of the German,

I

revolut1on, for he sa1d: "If she [Germany] fa11s, the others

I
I,

probably will.,21
Off101al German-Amer1oan relations at the oonclus10n
of the revolut1onary per10d underWent a rather strange trans-

f

formation, primar1ly because of the change of adm1n1strations
from James Polk to Zachary Tayior in 1849.

1849.

18

During his oountry't'
t

Ib1d. Quotes Massaohusetts guarterly Review, Marc\,

19

Ib1d., 36.
20 ~., 45-46.

21 Merle E. Curt1, 'John O. Calhoun and the Unification of Germany," 'Amerioan Historical Review, XL, 1935, 476-478~

,______________________________

I
I

~-------------I,

8

. struggle with Denmark at that time, Baron

the Ger-

~on R~enne,

,man ambassador to lashington, sought aid from

:~e

United States

'government, the latter of which oonsented to Prussia's use of
Amerioan naval laws, gun
formation.

~..aft·s,

do ok plans, and taotical in-

President Polk approved even the manning and pro-

visioning of an Amerioan frigate for dispatoh to Bremen, a prooess which was readily our tailed when Taylor took offioe.

~ol

lowing an offioial Danish protest, the Justioe Department demanded of von Roenne that he submit a bond of 'peaceful intent"
for the ship.

The ambassador rather reluotantly oomplied, and

the vessel was finally able to olear the port of New York on
May 24, 1849, although an aooident prevented it from ever being
used in servioe against the Danes.

Taylor's policy.of

non~ln

tervention was widely aoolaimed by the Amerioan people, who,
t~ougb

sympathetio to the German oause, were quite averse to

violating the1r traditional manner of keep1ng aloof from the
affairs of Europe. 22

,

During the period of the Oivil War in the \Jni ted State, ,
Amerioan relations with Germany were oarried on mainly through
the media of d1plomaoy and f1nanoe, although the war itself had
its effects upon trade and publio op1n10n in Prussia and her
ter states.
22

'~'--""""--.-,,-.,

-

SiT'

Both the Un10n and Confederacy had envoys in PrusMcGrane, 334-339.

... - .." ..----.~- ...... ---.---~~ .... -"."""""" ... ~~." ..- - . - - .
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..

9
,

sia, while the latt,er' and several other German provinces were
also represented in Amerioa.

The Prussian ambassador
was Frei..

herr von Gerolt, a pro-Unionist who knew the Amerioan soene
well.

From Bremen oame Rudolf Sohleiden, a keen man of commerc

who even offered himself in 18S1 as mediator for
proohement between the warring faotions, but who was unsucoessful in his mission. 23
Publio opinion in Prussia was divided, although the
greater number of oitizens~were Union sympathizers. 24 Yet, as
Carl Sohurz reported, the Oonfederaoy had many supporters among
the army caste.
I
I

I
I!

I
,,

I

!

I

~hO

"hated democraoy and wished that the RepUbl1t

of the United States, as the greatest and most attraot1ve example of demooraoy, should fall. "25

Nevertheless, .despite this

diVision, the Amerioan legation was so flooded in mid-1SSl with
applioations from German enlistees that a notioe had to be post
ed stating that the building was "not a reoruiting office!" 2 6
23 Stolberg, 47; Ralph H. Lutz, 'Rudolf Sohleiden and
the Visit to Riohmond,' Amerioan Historioal Assooiation Annual
Report, Washington, D.C., 1915, 207-a16.
24 That is, among those of any opinion at all.
25 Stolberg, 50-51.
2S Ibid. Numbers of aotual German personnel who
fought in Nortnern and Southern ranks are given on pg. 54. Clte
Kaufmann, Q!! Deutsohen ~ amerikanischen BUrgerkriege, 131.

,

10

The

~ress,

represented by books, newspapers, and per-

iodicals, reflected the same divided outloOk.~7
i

Offioial oir-

oles, on the other band, leaned more to a neutral pos1tion. For

I

I

I

example, Count Otto von

I

Bl~marok,

ohanoellor after 1862, was un-

oonvinoed by his sohool friend, John Lathrop Motley, that right

I

!

was wholly with the North, and thus often spoke of the "h1ghly
oultured men of the South. 128 Too, as a believer in the 1ni

equa11ty of ind1viduals and races, he opposed the total emano1p
tion of slaves.
i

I

Strangely enough, the war touohed Germany both econ-

.i

omioally and finanoially.

I

Though their ootton imports were muc

lower than those of either Franoe or Great Britain, both Prussi

I

I

and Bavaria suffered ill effeots from the shortage 'of this ran
material. 29 In fact, due to the seriousness of the situation,
steps were early taken for the proteotion of German trade, particularly through the Union's announoement that it would adhere
to the Deolarat1on of Paris of 1856 which abolished the praotioe of privateering. 30
27

-Ibid.,
Ibid.,

51-52.

28
63. Mitohell Xing, a fraternity brother 0
Bismarck, was from the South.
29 Ibid., 49-50. Cites Bismarok, Gesammelte Werke,
X, 149, and OloawIg-Hohenlohe, DenkwUrdigkeiten, I, 147.
30 Bemis, Seoretaries of state, VI, 145-294, 420431; Stolberg, 48-49.

"
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'More w1despread, however, were the f1nano1al aspects
of the war, espeo1ally

B~noe

both bel11gerents approaohed the

'German states for monetary loans.

.

Efforts of Robert J. Walker

for the Union and Baron RapHael Erlanger for the Southern Con.. -

federaoy oulminated in the solioitation of huge sums of needed
funds. 31 The Confederates enjoyed early suooesses, but later
fruits went to the Northerners, primarily beoause the R1c~ond
government was not reoognized in Prussia. 32 As time went by,
even the direct purohase of arms beoame d1ffioult for the South
erners, and their attempt to disoredit Northern seourities met
with dismal fa11ure.
The

year~

between 1866 and 1871 Witnessed the tremen-

dous efforts of Count Bismarck to unify the polyglot German
states into one empire.

The resulting wars with Austria and

with France oaused a flurry of Amerioan interest both in favor
or and against the German aotions.

In the first conflict Prus-

sia was generally regarded as the aggressor,33 although muoh
contempt was also heaped upon Catholio Austria by the champions
of Protestantism in the United States.

Suoh oomments as that

31 Stolberg, 57-58. Quotes Walker as reminding the
Amerioan people in 1867 that Germans aocepted $250,000,000 wort
of U.S,. bonds. Corroberates statement by oiting Ellis J. Obel'holtzer, Jay Gould, I, 513, who puts the figure at $200,000,000.
32 Ibid., 60. Cites Dept. of State, DisEatches, Prus~, II, No. l~
33 Qazley, 178.

,

Iwhioh was expressed
I

Imon:"

12
by the Portland TranscriRt were not unoom-

..

The migh~ of Protestantism and the free tendencies of Germany have triumphed over the
foroes of despotism and religious intoleranoe.34

.--

Finally, when the North German Oonfederation was formed, many
Amerioans, looking back to 1848, found reason to rejoice, but
at the same time there were those who looked somewhat

ask~oe

at the establishment of a powerful Prussian despotlsm whioh
might easily spread elsewhere. 36
More direct relations between the Amerioan and German
peoples took plaoe during the Franco-Prussian struggle whlch
commenced in July, 1870.

A mutual amity was exemplified in the

servioes of Mr. Elihu B. Washburne, American ambassador to Par~

is, who kindly consented to manage affairs at the Prussian legation for the duration of hostilities.

During this time, some

II

thirty thousand individuals of German birth were provided with

i

the means to flee from Frenoh violenoe, and more than twenty

I
i

I

\

thousand others were supported with one and two dollar doles fo \
months at a time.~6 Washburne was publioly honored in Berlln
for his servioes shortly after the war's end.

-

34 Ibid., 204-205. Quotes Portland Transoript, August 18, 1866.
35 ~., 231.
36 Adolf Hepner, America's Aid to Germany in 1870~, st. Louis, MO., no publlsher glven;I905, passii7

13
The American attitude toward the,confllot in its in-

I

I'itial stages is neatly summed up by GazleYI w;o'says: "Most
! Northerners, most Westerners, -most Protestants, most Republic-

ans, most American patriots sympathized with the Prussian
oause. n37 Antagonism toward French maohinations in Uexico,~8
the greater ratio of German over Frenoh immigrants in this ooun
try, and the ever-present religious faotor 39 were oombined·to
create this opinion.

.

After Sedan l however l a oonsiderable shif

took plaoe in Amerioan thought,40 and there was an intense
for materials to suooor the gallant French, orushed as they wer
by
~he most relentless and malignant of oonquerors that the Old World had seen since
Att1la and h1s Huns earned the t1tle of
the soourge of God.41

i

I
I
I

,i

Hosti11t1es oeased in the spr1ng of 1871, and consequently these attitudes were soon diss1pated.

Nevertheless,

with the founding of _the Empire at Versailles a new era of German-Amer10an relations began to unfold 1tself.

The day of par- ,

37 Gazley, 322.
38 1Jlli!., 327. Quotes San Franoisoo Bulletin, August 31, 1870.
39 Scribner's Magazine, Deoember, 1870, exemplified
this factor when it said: ilClose upon the heels of the Papal fa1~,-:
[infallibility] was the attaok of France upon Prussia; of P2 f pa France, be it noted, upon Protestant Prussia. 1I GazIey, 354.
40 Gazley, 380-381.

Ecr

41

Ibid., 398. Quotes New York Times, Sept. 28, 1810.

14

oohialiam soon disappeared and with it vanished the spirit of
amity and oo-operation
whioh had oolored the interoourse of the
.
~

two na tiona for over a oentury. - Of oourse, the ohange oould
hardly be noticed in those early years, but yet the seed of
the First World War were slowly being sown in the petty, then
more serious oommeroial confliots that speokled the eighties,
the nineties, and the first one and one-half deoades of the •
twentieth oentury.
The first real symptom of this growing transformation
came in 1879 when Bismarok induoed the German parliament to
abandon its polioy of low tariff and to adopt a new system of
high duties and pronounced proteotlon. 42 The ohancellor then
initiated a plan whereby he gained privileges by

giv~ng

them,

thereby building up a tremendous industrial output whioh in
turn refleoted itself in a great and expanding commerce.
As a result of this growth, Germany was put in a bet\

ter position to trade with the United States, and thus began to
import Amerioan food and raw materials in large quantities. How
ever, the Reioh soon found that it was underbid on cheap manufactured produots, with the oonsequence that an era of aoute
industrial rivalry oame into being. 43 In 1883 the Germans beg
42 Oharles Downer Hazen, Modern Europe, New York,
Henry Holt and Company, 1926, 477.
43 Stolberg, xviii.

,

15
restriotions on Am~r1oan agrioultural produot8,44 a practice
which soon brought retaliat10n from the United ..States in form
of an aot requiring a variable tonnage duty on ships based upon

.

their distanoe from home ports. 45

The matter came to nothing,

however, probably beoause Bismarck aocorded little signifioance
to American affairs in his diplomatic oaloulations. 46 His
l

shortsightedness, nevertheless, was to have disastrous reperoussions in the future.
Oommerc1al rivalry between Amer10a and Germany mounted in 1890 to a point where d1plomaoy was needed to av01d more
aorimonious developments.

The McKinley Tar1ff Act of that year

not only raised import duties to a peak theretofore unknown,47
b.ut also gave the

Pr~sident

the power to make

dutlab~e

any

item

on the free list ooming from oountries deemed discriminating

I

against Amerioan products.

I

the Germans who were rest rioting certain meats imported from

I

I

I

,
I

This act so thoroughly frightened

this country, that a conference, known as the Saratoga Conven-

I

I

tion, was arranged for settlement of this problem in 1891.

A

44 MoOlure, 694-695.
45 ~.; John Bassett Moore, A Digest of Intern~
tional ~, Washington, D.C., U.8. Qov't. Printing Off., 1906,

~88.

46 E. Maloomb Oarroll, Germany and the Great Powers:
~-l9l4, New York, Prentice-Hall, Ino., 19t8;-4l0.
47 McClure, 694-695.
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promise not to use the duty-f1x1ng power was thus exohanged for
cancellation of the 'disoriminatory regulations employed by the
...
48
Reich.
Another aspeot of_the antagonistio German-Amerioan
commeroial pioture between 1880 and 1910 was oonoerned with the
most-favored-nat1on policies followed by the two nations.

In

America, as far baok as 1778,49 treaties of this sort were oonsidered conditionally, that is, favors were acoorded only to
those nations which tendered equivalent oompensation.

The Ger-

mans, on the other band, followed a polioy of rendering treatment equal to the best aooorded to any other country, and this
uncondi tionally.

Above all, as the Germans gave, so they also

sought to reoeive. 50
As a result, ·with no other country did the American
interpretation of the most-favored-nation olause give rise to
so many or suoh persistent disputes as with Germany.n 5l On one
oooasion, in 1884, the Germans protested a trade oonoession giv
en to Switzerland whioh was not similarly aooorded to them, but
their claims were resolutely ignOred. 52 Again, in 1902, a simi
48
49

Ibid.; Oarroll, 410.
McClure, 689-701.

50

~.

51 Fisk, "Most-Favored-Nation Relations," 220-236.
52 MoOlure J 696-697.
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1ar request was, made for oertain "oonoessions" suoh as were enjoyed by Cuba, but .Amerioan offioials
the Cubans deserved "special

refused,~la~ing

~elattonsn

that

due to their prox1mity

to the United States. 53 Affairs were partially smoothed over
through tariff revisions by both nations during 1909 and 1910,
although pr10r to 1922 the basic problem of oonflioting inter-

•

pretations of most-favored-nation polioies were never oompletely solved. 54
A seoond and probably greater souroe of international
friotion after 1871 developed in the oolonial field.

True

enough, Bismarok seemingly55 opposed overseas expansion in the

Ii

I
1

early years of the infant Empire, but his own polioy of proteotion, formulated in 1879, plus the implantation of individual German firms in

wo~ld

trade oenters oaused the chanoellor to

ohange his mind by 1884, when he adopted a vigorous program of
oolonization for the Reioh. 56
Destined to olash in both the Paoifio and the Caribbean, Amerioa and Germany first found themselves at oolonial
cross-purposes in Samoa, an island group strategically located
Ibid.~

696n.
54 Ib1d., 696.
55 Mary E. Townsend, The B!!! and Fall of Germany's
Colon1al Emuire: 1884-1918, New York, Maomill~o., 1930,
Chapte'rUtII.
56 Hazen, 468.
53

,

on the trade

~oute.

to Australia,

Ohina~

18
Oalifornia, and even

Europe in the event of a canal being built at Panama.

In 1854

the Hamburg firm of Johann Oesar Godefroy planted itself at Api
on Upolu Island and began to raise cotton for export.

Within

a little more than two decades suoh progress was made by this
company that annexation rumors were rampant in Sydney, Australla, and this, despite the emphatio statement of the Imperial
Government that it had "no desire to aoquire the Samoan Islands,
nor indeed any colonies for Germany.a57
The first permanent American entry into the Samoa region took plaoe in 1872 when Commander R.W. Meade of the

usa

Narragansett conoluded a treaty with the native ohiefs for an
exolusive naval station at Pago Pago.
!

I

I

I
i

The United States Senate

.

disapproved of this move,58 however, and thus President Ulysses
Grant sent Colonel A.B. Steinberger to the islands as his personal representative, an aotion whioh' soon ripened into a Samo
desire for annexation by this oountry.

Steinberger's deporta\

tiOD -- a result of Amerioan, British, and German oonsular jeal
ousies 59 -- ended in a vioious oivil war among the islanders.
57 Sylvia Masterman, The Origins of International Ri
in Samoa: 1854-1884, London;-Allen andirrnwin, 1~34, 79.uotes Russell to Deroy;-November 6, 1874.
58 Samuel Flagg Bemis, ! Diplomatic [iator~ o~ the
United States, New York, Henry Holt and 00., 19~6, 405-456; Eas
terman, II~. Cites House Exeo. Dooument 161, 44 Congo, 1 Sess.,-3.
59 George H. Ryden, ~ Foreig~ Polioy £! 1££ U.~.
in Relation to Samoa, New Haven, Yale U. Press, 19~~, 140-147.
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When the Germanstr1ed to ourb the violenoe, a paot of am1ty
and med1at10n was negot1ated between the Samoans and Amer10a
wh10h n10ely reserved the

1sl~nds

for future Un1ted States own-

ership -- or at,least prevented the same from falling 1nto the
hands of Br1tain or Germany.SO

Yet, 1t so happened that these

nations likewise oonoluded territor1al treaties with the Samoan
chiefs, aotions wh10h v1rtually foroed the establishment of •a
three-headed

controll~ng

un1t at Ap1a in 1879.

Th1s preoarious politioal balanoe was still in ex1stenoe f1ve years later when Bismarck inaugurated his oolon1al
plans.

The Germans now took

adv~~age

of a nat1ve upr1s1ng and

prooeeded tora1se the1r own flag over the territory, a move
whioh brought a strong protest from the Amerioan Seoretary of
state, Thomas Bayard.

After unsuooessful disoussions, the mat-

ter went to President Grover Oleveland for settlement, but Bismarck, anxious to avoid further friotion with Amerioa,Sl suggested a new meeting to take plaoe in Berlin in 1889.

Here was

formed a tri-partite oondomin1um,S2 quite 1noompat1ble with Amer
ioan traditions, but whioh endured for the entire next deoade.

A final settlement, preoipitated by the Spanish-Amerioan War,
60

Bemis, 455-456.

61

Stolberg, xvii.

63

Bem1s, 458, 8bB-S5S.

,
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eventually divided the islands between the Ge%man Empire and
the United

States~

Great Britain receiving compensat10n 1n othe

parts of the Pac1fic.
The Samoan ep1socre- served two purposes worthy of notice.

First~

1t not only gave an initial impetus to Amer10an

imperialism 1n the

Paoif1o~

but thUS paved the way for further

fr1otion with the Reich in future years.

Seoondly~

it forced

1nto the open the first real indioat10n of German intent10ns to
build a oolonial emp1re outside of

and heralded the arrival of a new and powerful element in internat10nal po11t1cs.53
Atrica~

The stage was indeed set for an era of intense German-Amer1can
ill aocord.
A second focal point of German colonial interest 1n
the Pacif1c during the late 1800's lay in the Philippine Islands~ the la8t remnant of Spain's rapidly deo11ning empire. 64

Muoh interest was directed toward these rioh lands when the

Sp

ish-American War began in 1898~ although the Reioh retained a
str10t neutra11ty throughout the confliot.

In the publio eye,

however, Amerioa was sharply condemned for her imperialism, and
the "defeat of the Un1ted States would undoubtedly have been
83 Olara E. Sohieber, liThe Transformation of American Sent1ment toward Germany: 1870-1914," Journal of International Relations, Baltimore,Md., XII, 1921, 58.
-84

.-.,............... ""'"-"",.....

Oarroll, 414 •

_.-....

,

21
pOPular. lle5

In faot, a viotory by this country was widely

viewed as surely to be

~ollowed

by "other atterJlPes to impose
(J

Amerioa's will on Europe. 1I65
By the early summer of 1898 even the diplomacy of
Prinoe Bernhard von Bulow,6? the German ohanoellor, had failed
to win any portion of the Philippines for the Empire.

Conse-

quently, a German fleet of five vessels arrived in Manila

I

1
/

I

Ii
r

I

II

~y

on June 20, presumably to take over the islands, either in oase
the United States did not keep them58 or decided to reward the
Reioh for its neutrality.59

In the weeks that followed, Admir-

al Diederiohs, the German oommander, not only seriously violated the blookade,70 but at one time arranged his fleet into
what seemed to·be a battle position -- a move whioh had to be
disoouraged by British naval intervention. 71
All this may seem unimportant to the oasual reader.
Nevertheless, in 1898 Amerioans at home were quiok to suspeot
55
65

-Ibid.,
Ibid.

412.
Oites Historisob-Politische Blatter, OXXII 1

71

-Ibid.,

80

297.
.
67 Lester B. Shippee, nGermany and the Spanish-Ameri
can War," American Historioal ReView, XXX, 1925, 764-765; Townsend, 193.
68 Shippee, 765, 774.
69 Townsend, 194.
70 Thomas A. Bailey, 'Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay," American Historical Revi8~, LXV, Ootober, 1939, 64-65.
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suoh German

aoti~~~ies

1ntended. 72

I
f

I
r

I
i

I

II
I
i

I

I

I
,

and attitudes, however they may have bee

The Manila inoidents, more than tho Samoan affair,

caused considerable ill-feeling'in both oountries, and helped
,

very muoh to prepare

Amerio~and

Germany for their respective

roles in the great world confliot which was to come.

This an-

tagonism was further intensified when the United States demanded and reoeived the entire Philippine arohipeligo from Spain.•
As one German source put it, this

~s

a oase of the "shameless

explOitation of their opponents' weakness" which the Americans
would some day regret. 73
From the turn of theoentury until the First World W
German-Amerioan antagonism continued unabated.

The colonial

area shifted, however, from the Paoifio to the Oaribbean wherein the pompous Reioh sought to obtain a foothold, despite the
preponderanoe there of American eoonomio interests.
ly offensive to

~he

Too, great

Germans at this time was the Monroe Doctrin

even Bismarck had oalled it an Ainternational impertinende"
and a "speoies of arroganoe peculiarly American· 74 -- and thus,
to override it would have been most gratifying to the Foreign
Office in Berlin.
72

,Ibid., 75-77, 80-81.

73

Oarroll, 416-417.

74

Sohieber, 64.
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The ~pire,' 8 first real ohanoe?5 to ac~ in aooordance
w1th its ambit10ns oame in 1902 when it

several

joined~1th

other European nations in aohastising" the Venezuelan governmen
for default 1n the payment --of its debts.

When Amer10a was

sounded and found to be unopposed to suoh aotion provided that
no lasting oooupat10n was attempted,?6 the powers blockaded and
bombarded several ports on the South Amerioan ooast.

~

Later,

however, the Germans hinted at a atemporary oocupation," so Sec
retary of state John Hay was forced to invoke the Monroe Doctrine and to call for arbitration of all claims by representatives of the United States.

The Germans hesitated, but soon ac

quiesoed as Amerioan publio opinion beoame aroused and a fleet
under Dewey was mobilized off Puerto Rioo.??
Throughout the Venezuelan episode, newspapers in the
United States denounoed the German aotion, agreeing that the
pr1mary objeot was to test the real strength of the Monroe Doctrine.

Moreover, Americans believed that the Reich actually

wanted not a settlement of debts but a permanent ocoupation of
terr1tory near the proposed Panama Oanal. 78 The entire affa1r,
soon followed by intrigues in Denmark to blook Amer1can purchas
75
1897, and 1n
76
77
78

~-"'>

........ -

_ .... _~.

-

Other suspioious moves had been made in Hait1 in
the Santa Margarita Islands off Venezuela 1n 1901.
Bemis, 522. Oites Vagts, Weltpo11t1k, II, 1540.
Ib1d., 522-524.
Sohieber, 65-66.

-:---0 ... __ .,....>___

-_~_,...

.....

~~"""

,...

.,...,~".',"

.....,..,. _ _ _ .---_. . _.

".~"

.,..

,

24

of the Danish West Indies
.
,79 oaused further distrust in the
!
i

United States of German amb1tions, and engendered
. a fear of the
Emp1re's mi11tar1sm and 1mperia11sm.

Th1s att1tude finally at-

tained such prevalenoe that .---1n the years preoeding 1914, the
Kaiser himself, lithe heaviest liab11ity wh10h Germany oarried
in her foreign policy from 1888 to 1918,·80 came to be regarded
as a veritable symbol of aggression, autocracy, and

Weltpoliti~.

He and his nat10n beoame particularly obnoxious to the American
people between Algeoiras and Sarejevo, when they generally favored paoifioism and arbitration as means of settling international dis~utes.81
The final culmination of almost a half-oentury of
commercial and colon1al r1valry between Germany and the United
states ooourred 1n 1917 when Amer1ca joined the Allies against

I1

I

the Reioh in World War I.

This event was not entirely caused,

of oourse, by the ill-will of prev10us years, but suoh longstanding antagonism d1d aot as an important faotor in

influ~c

ing the Amer1can people to make their final de01sion.
Throughout the first three years Of the European war,
Amerioa was offioially neutral, although most sympathy in this
79 T.W. Arnold, German Ambitions as They Affect Britain and the United States of America, New YorK, G.P."Putnam's
sons and-Sm1th, Elder and
i9~, 34-51; Bemis, 521-522.
80 Sohieber, 68.

co.,

81

-Ibid.,

68-69.
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i
I

I

country lay with the ,Allies. sa

This posit10n, w1th a corres-

ponding antipathy towards the Reioh, beoame

pre~alent

soon afte

the invasion of Belgium by the Kaiser's armies, and grew sO
strong with the subsequent
i

I

r

I

f

Ii
I

I

~arrage

of propaganda that

(b]efore long it became an artiole of faith
with the man in the street that the Kaiser
(known as the "Beast of Berlin") had wantonly provoked the war; (and] when he had won
it he would come over with millions of spiked
helmets and make short work of the United
states and the Monroe Doctrine • • .83
As in several previous wars, the United States was

i

the most important neutral oarrier, and again as usual, her

II

rights were trampled upon by the ahief combatants.

I

I

Violations

by the Allied powers were often just as serious as those of Ger

many, but while the cost from the first figured only in dollars,
the seoond type of friction was soon found to mean the loss of

I

Amerioan lives. a4

I

Washington to halt the selling of war goods to the Allies, but

I

when President Wilson defended America's right to oontinue such

,!

I

The Germans early pressed the government at

,

sales, the Reioh decided to pursue a stronger course of aotion.
As a result, in a war zone set up around the British Isles,
three ships -- inoluding the Lusitania -- were sunk by mid-19l5,
82 Bailey, 612.
83 1,lli., 614.
84 Said the Boston Globe in this regard: "One is a
gang of thieves, the other a gang of murderers. On the whole, 1'1'
prefer the thieves ••• as the lesser of two evils." Builey, 646.

I'

26

with the consequent loss of over one hundred thirty American
oitizens. SS

.

I

I

I

I

This last act inoensed the
Germans.

'I

.

enti~.

nation against the

As the New York Nation framed it:
The torpedo that sank the Lusitania also sank
Germany in the opinion of mankind. • • It is
,at onoe a crime and a monumental folly • • • •
She has affronted the moral sense of the
world and saorifioed her standing among the
nations-S6

I
I

The United States government protested the sinking or its ships
and received German assuranoes of no recurrenoe,S? although it
was not until February of the next year that the Reich agreed

II

to assume liability for Amerioan losses on the Lusitania.
Such pledges were broken and renewed several times by \
the Germans before the end of 1916.

Toward the olose of Januar

of the followlng year, however, the Imperlal foroes were in suc
straits that the Berlin government felt lt neoessary to resume
unrestricted submarine warfare, and thus to stake all on a fina
\

Victory.

This was soon followed by the publication in American

.

newspapers of seoret German dlplomatic advances to Mexlco promising her large traots of western land if she were to ally her
S5

Balley, 626.

86

Ibid., 627.

87

~.,

630.

Cltes New York Nation, May 13, 1915.
Quotes

~

Memolrs

~

Lansing, 48.
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self ~1th the R~1oh,1n a war against the Un1ted States. SS
information plus oontinued sinkings oaused euoh

~

Th1s

wave of anti-

German sentiment to sweep the oountry that Oongress f1nally de-

I
I

I

I

olared war aga1nst the Imperial government on Apr11 6, 1917."
The final ohapter, then, of German-Amer1can relations
before 1919 was wr1tten in the blood of both countrymen during
the olosing years of the r1rst World War.

i

When the end came in

November, 1915, Bismarok's Empire existed no longer; only the
German people remained to build anew upon its ashes.

The great

problems of reoonstruotion, of politioal reorganization, and
above all, of eoonomio and diplomatio reconc1l1at1on w1th Ameri
ca and the world faced the battered Re1ch.

It is, then, to a

detailed aocount of these post-war developments --

n~w

l1nks

1n the long ohain of inter-relations between the United States
and Germany -- that this investigat10n now turns its attent1on.

,

88

Ib1d., 642-643.

OHAPTER II
,
I

I
Ii

THE BEGINNINGS 'or A lEW AMITY
..

i

--

uPon the signing of the Armistice in November, 1918,

f

I

a new ohapter began in the long history of German-American re-

/

be called auspicious ones, however, for with a baokground of

I

lations.

The oiroumstanoes surrounding this ohange oould noi

distrust, rivalry, and finally open warfare, the wounds that
needed healing were many indeed.

A mutual feeling of enmity,

whether warranted by faots or not, had reaohed its climax in
the struggle just ended, and thus it would seem that a long
period of political and so01al oonvalescence was necessary
be- .
.
fore a return to normal interoourse

~ould

be reaohed.

Publio opinion, both in Amerioa and in the Reich, was
quite divided for some time

af~er

the war.

Yet, it

~an

be said

in general that a stronger anti-German feeling prevailed among
the people of the United States than was manifested against
America by the Germans in Europe.

Strangely enough, even the

Weimar Republio, different as it was from the former imperial
regime, oame in for muoh oriticism in Amerioan newspapers and
periodicals, ohiefly beoause of the belief that its leaders did
not intend to fulfill the terms of the Versailles Treaty.
28

This

,

29

: notion grew up among Amerioans beoause of German statements re0

o,

garding the injustice of the Paris pact.

ror

ly after the Germans had been handed the

pe~oe

man MUller, the Minister
quoted as

I
I

.

of~oreign

e.~pl.,

short-

terms, Dr. Her-

Affairs in the Reich, was

s~ying:

Yielding to superior foroes, and without renounoing in the meantime its own view of the
peaoe oonditions, the Government of the German Republio deolares that it is ready to aooept and sign the oonditions of peace imposed·l
.

I

I

Again, Premier Gustav Bauer opined that by the peaoe terms Germany was
violated body and soul to the horror of the
world • • • • Let us sign, but it is our
hope to the last breath that this attempt
against our honor may one day recoil against
its authorS.a
Even Vorw!rts, the Sooialist sheet and semi-governmental organ,
made the following statement:

I
I

l

I,

Extortionate pressure renders signature of
the Peaoe Treaty worthless. We must never
forget it is only a sorap of paper. Treaties based on violenoe oan keep their validity only so long as foroe exists. Do not
loae hope. The resurreotion day oomes.3
Taking these statements at their faoe value, many

i
I

i

I

1 "Future Relations with Germany," Literary Digest,
New York, Funk and Wagnalls 00., LXII, July 5, r~l~, 2i.
2

Ibid.

3

-Ibid.
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Amerioan

pressm~n

filled their readers with highly emotional

and rashly-put accusations against the German people as a
whole.

The New York Oommercial
neatly summarized its opinion
u

in these words:

-

....

, Does there exist a power, within or without,
that can bring to Germany the moral regeneration without whioh she oan never reoover
the respeot of·mankind?4
Similarly, the St. Louis Star aocused the Republic of being a

I

I

I,

disarmed triokster rather than a reformed
conspirator (and thus will obey the Versailles
Treaty] only to the extent that compliance
is foroed by .the Allies. 5
Another editor, this time of the Baltimore·Sun, said in the
strongest tones:
The Huns run true
have anything but
of liars, fiends,
has proved itself

to form • • • • Who oan
oontempt for such a nation
and hypootrites as Germany
to be'6

Finally, a direot attack upon the Weimar government
oame out in the Philadelphia Publio Ledger.

This newspaper

oited the sinking of the German fleet at Soapa Flow and the
burning of oertain Frenoh battle-flags as proof of the treaohery to be expeoted of a nation as evil as the Reioh.
Ebert regime was desoribed as follows:
4

Ibid.

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid.

The

,
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There are abundant reasons to doubt the bonafides of the German 'Republio' and to aooept
the theory that the 'revolution' has been
from the first the oover under which an unreformed and unrepentent nation hoped 'to esoape the ignominy of defeat and shift to mere
puppets the responsi~ility both for the acceptance and tJle subsequent evasion of peace
conditions which Germany has no intention of
fulfilling.?
It seems, then, that a distrustful attitude remained
long among the Amerioan people. 8

Some newspaper and periodidal

souroes tried to overoome this wartime anti-Germanism by appealing to a reasonable approaoh to the question, especially
through the medium of trade.

Yet, even this was hard to ac-

complish beoause few businessmen had respeot for Germans and
German-made goods.

The Wall Street Journal had this to say:

It would be diffioult to make a German see the
loathing and oontempt withwhioh he is regarded by large numbers of people with whom he formerly did business on equal terms. The label
'Made in Germany' in this oountry, Franoe, and
the British Empire will damn artioles of German manufacture as long as the memory of bad
faith, oruelty, and arroganoe endures.9
Nevertheless, the same newspaper pOinted out the faot that
Germany must be kept alive to work out her own
salvation in fear and trembling. But it would
Ib1d., 22.
8 Other examples of Amerioan anti-Germanism are recorded in Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace,
.New York, Macmillan 00., 1944, 305=306.
?

9

"Future Relations with Germany,n Literarx Digest,
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be folly to' deny that living down her past
reoord will dissipate the few illusions the
German people have left to them -10
..
The St. Louis Republic was more level-headed about
this matter, for 1t saw that--1n
some way or other Germany must trade, and the
nations of the earth must be reasonable 1n
this regard. Where trade with Germany 1s
benefioial on both sides and does no injustice
to those countries that Germany despoiled,
trade with Germany should be resumed;. for,
otherwise the Germans oan not meet their obligations abroad and oppose Bolshevism at
home. Prejudice against Germany and Germanmade goods is inevitable, but the more rapidly it gives way to calmly reasoned policy the
better • • - -11
Aoross the At1antio l however. a somewhat different
attitude was exhibited by the defeated Germans toward the Unite

.

States.' It would seem that an intense hatred should have been
shown in most qU8%ters toward that one nation wh1ch l by aiding
the Allies,' bad snatched the fruita of viotory from a proud and
powerful Germany about to administer the ooup

~'~~race

to he:

,.",t' ';','''.

struggling enemies.

Like"ise l a large degree''o~'~~sonal coo"

. I

f..' , '"

tempt might have well been expected for Woodrow Wilson, who, as
President, epitomized the Amerioan people and all they stood
for.

Yet, the German populaoe seems not to have formed either
10

11

Ibid.
-Ibid.
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of these attitudes·to. any extent,12 but rather ohose to view
America and her leader not so muoh as former enemies,
but more
.
as future benefactors.

,

VorwArts, the Socialist paper, whether

.

actually in earnest or in searoh for sympathy, printed the following eulogy on the American nation and

Pres~dent:

It was wholly and solely the entry of the
United States into the war which brought a
final victory to the Entente. It is now
the Sacred duty of the United States to see
that this victory does not degenerate into
debauch of cruelty, revenge, and oppression. It was the adoption of the high ideals
set forth in your peaoe program by the German democracy which brought German militarism and autocracy to the ground. And now
the liberated peoples of Oentral Europe, Mr.
President, expeot you to carry out what you
had promised them and what· your allies had
accepted as the basis of peaoe. The people
of the German Republio look to you as the
most powerful of statesmen to use that in- .
fluenoe whioh today weighs more heavily than
that of any other man, to establish the
foundations upon whioh the United Republios
of Europe may be built, thus giving existence to something whieb the fanatio nationalists in all lands have hitherto thought
impossible·13
Another tribute was paid to Wilson by members of the
German Armistioe Oommission, who oonoluded their report in 1920
by,saying:

,

,

\

This'volWlle: 'shows what the Armistice oon4-1tions mean to Germany. Unfortunately they
are not designed to oarry out the grea. aim
which President Wilson .proolaimed in his
speech of the Fourth of July, 1918, in the
words: "What we seek is the re1gn of law,
based upon the consent of the governed and
susta1ned by the organ1zed opin10n of mankind·"14

~

Even the oommon people of Germany, while heaping

r

I
.1

coals upon the heads of the European Entente, showed 11ttle etldence of oynioism or feeling of revenge against the Unlted
States.

A few Germans, no doubt, agreed w1th a "lead1ng c1ti-

zen and wholesale wine merchant" who was quoted as being of
the op1nion that the idea of the g1gantic indemnity
oame from Amerioa, where money 1s ten t1mes
as abundant as 1t is here (Germany]. '1'0
Americans this sum may not sound so 1noalculable. But to us Germans -- oh, no, that·
will have to be ohangedo15
Nevertheless, this idea was not widespread in the Reich.

More

of the average people probably agreed with a barber who said of
Wilson that if he
sticks to his Fourteen Polnts, and w. believe
he will, I oan assure you right now that a
14 J. El11s Barker, "The Present State of Feeling in
Germany,· The ~arterls Revlew, New York, Leonard Soott Publis
1ng Co., cOXXX ,Octo er, 1920, 316. QuotesDle Deutsche Waffenst11lstande Komm1ss10n, Mater1alen betreffena-dle Waffen=-stillstandeverbandlungen, OhariottenbUl'g, 1920, Teil VIII.
15 liThe Cortunon People of Germany on the 'Peace Treaty
Literary Digent, LXII, July 12, 1919, 70-76.
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monument will be ereoted to him ln Germany,
not simply in the memories of the peopla, but
an actual .ontiment of stone and bronzeJ ~w1th
appropriate lnscriptionselS
'
In the same way,

a'~£stinguished

physlclan", bellevlng that

tbe treaty terms were "frightful," claimed that the money could
never be pald.

YetI he stl1l seemingly looked to the Presi-

dent for guidanoe by asking, "Where are Wilson's Fourteen

•

points?"l?
Finally, a rather frank fellow explained his stand
quite well when he said without malice:
If America had never sent ammunition to the
Allies, and there was no reason why she should,
we would never have sunk your boats • • • •
You forced us to give you an excuse for declaring war against us. Then came \'ilson and his
Fourteen Points. I have never seen such enthusiasm for a man and a oause as was manifested at that time in Germany for Wilson and his
doctrine. He thereby inveigled us into the
armistioe. We had • • • soldiers, • • • ammunition, • • • and unshaken determination and
will power. But we stopt [sio] since there was
no reason for our oontinuing the war, Wilson
having assured us ot all we wanted. • • • And
now we have the terms of peaoe. The Fourteen
Points are nowhere to be found. Wilson has put
his foot in it (~ sich blamiert) ~efore the
whole world • • • .18
Opinion in both countries, of course, did not remain
static, but rather tended gradually to soften as the war faded
16

ru,g,.

17
18

~.

Ibid.,

7~.
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into the

backgro~d.

Consequently, it was during the first

five years after 1918 that the more important steps were taken
to revive German-American
gressed rather slowly,

frie~dship.

howeve~,

This rapproohement pro-

for during the first two and

one-half years after the armistioe an offioial state of war
still existedrbetween the two oountries, and thus relations
tended to be extremely 0001, formal, and very muoh restrioted
to necessities.

~

Most of the interoourse whioh did ooour oame

about through private trading, although as soon as it beoame
evident Lthat the Treaty of Versailles would not be aocepted,
weak political ties were effeoted whioh were intended to serve
as temporary .faoilities during the extens1ve 1nterim.
Ind1vidual interests and 'pre-oooupations, moreover,
aoted further to oomplioate matters, for the Germans, war-weary
and 1n the throes of revolut10n, were hard pressed with suoh im
mediate home problems as the establishment of the republio, the
conolusion of a peaoe based upon the harsh terms of Versailles,
and above all, the solving of the terrible question of starvation.

The first of these problems took pre-eminence over the

others, for a suooessful politioal ohange was needed both as a
defense against radioal Bolshevism and as a means of winning
more generous terms from the viotoriousAllies. 19
19 It will be remembered that Wilson, in late 1918,
Offered peaoe terms based upon the Fourteen Points if the Hohen
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This transition was made in a legal

mann~r

several

days before the armistioe when Prince Max of Baden" the Imper- .
1al Ohanoellor, handed over his ,offioe to Fri$derio~~bert, a
humble leather-worker and member of the Sooial Demooratio party.20

A provisional oabinet was formed whioh, after waging a

suooessful fight against the Bolshevists, gave way to an eleoted legislature oalled the Reiohstag in February, 1919.

Ebert

•

was ohosen President, while the ohanoellorship went to his
oolleAgUe, Philip Soheidemann.

In the legislature, however,

jihe Sooialists held only one hundred eighty-five out of three
hundred ninety-nine seats,2l and therefore it was plain that a
regime based purely upon this party's prinoiples was out of the
question.

Signifioantly enough, at no time in the history of

the Republio did this situation

~prove,

but rather it remained

to plague the German government with instability and laok of
faith on the part of the people themselves.

The German revolu-

zoellern war-lords were OVerthrown. It is very probable
the old imperial government might have been retained had
been for this event. "Oorrespondenoe between the United
and Germany Regarding an Armistioe," Amerioan Journal of
national Law, 1919, XIII, 85-96; Bailey, Loat Peaoe, ~67
20 Robert Ergang, Europe in
Heath and Company, 1949, 119.
21

~

States

Inter-

Time, New York, D.C.

Ibid., 121.
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t10n, then,

oanno~'be

,said to have made a oomplete break with

the past, but to have ereoted in the plaoe of the former regime
only a superfio1al po;l1t1cal expedient wh10h left the old soo

oial and eoonomio struoture ihtaot.
Despite these great hand1oaps, however, the new
government toiled from February to August, 1919, in framing a
constitution for the new Reioh.

Its efforts were not in vain,•

for in the oompleted dooument there was embodied one of the fin
est examples of liberal demooraoy known to the world at that
time.

As opposed to the fundamental law of the old empire,

whioh was essentially a treaty between rulers, the new const1tu
t10n gave expression to theewill of the sovereign German people
as voiced through their representatives, for it began:, aThe Ger
man state is a republioj politioal authority springs from the
peoPle. naa Yet, it was not intended to oompletely unify the na
tion, for it provided that the old states, new termed Lander,
\

should retain their own oonst1tutions and sovereign governments.
In other words, republioan Germany was to be oonstituted on a
federal basis.
The Weimar Republio under Ebert, then, was destined t
remain the Reich's offioial ruling organ for the next fourteen
22

-Ibid.,

124

,
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years.

It was,

a~ove'all,

that regime with whioh the surren-

der had been negotiated, and whose
to deal with the European
terms.

Enten~e'

responsib1lity~lt

now was

and America regarding peaoe

As will be explained·presently, this resulted in a

certain olose relationship -- rarely considered in connection
with the Paris oonference -- which oame into existenoe between
the United States and Germany.
It will be remembered that, through the efforts of
the idealistio Wilson, Germany had consented to oall a halt to
the war, and thus the Reich justly looked forward to a fair
peaoe based upon the Fourteen POints. 23 This turn of events
placed the United States squarely between the Allies and Germany, for, due to the inclusion of suoh prinoiples as those of
freedom of tne seas and of self-determination, the Amerioan
delegates were neoessarily ob11ged to defend oerta1n German
rights as well as those of other peoples, and therefore oould
not rightfully co-operate to the fullest extent with their viotorious assooiates.

This situation was further complioated by

the British refusal to even oonsider the re-organization of
maritime laws, as suggested by Wilson's Second Point, for by
this aot Amerioa, for all praotioal purposes, was ejected from

I

L

23 Bailey,

~~

Peaoe, 36.

,
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I the Allied tribunal. One author24 goes so far as to imply that
1
I

I

I

)

her only real conoern, and the one for which the . United States
fought against Germany, was thus·eliminated.

If this is true,25 ]

then from that time forward, .Jf1lson and h1s oolleagues remained
in Europe more to fulfill the role of arb1tors than actually to
partioipate in a peace oonferenoe.
Woodrow Wilson failed, for the most part, to
his lofty dreams.

realiz~

The Allies, espeoially Franoe, were deter-

mined to satisfy their own particular desires, and thus one by
one the prinoiples upon which the German people: expected their
future to be based were. rejeoted at Paris, and in their place
a mass of vindiotive clauses were organized into what oame to
~

be known as the Treatj of Versailles.

The Reioh was handed a

stone where bread was expeoted, for it was despoiled of much of
its land and population, ocoupied in part by Allied troops,
plaoed under a crushing burden of reparations, and made to acoept the entire responsibility tor the late world war. 2S It can
be said in truth that, though self-determ1nation remained the
Allied watohword, it was applied in almost every case except in
24 Guglielmo Ferrero, "Amerioa's Role in the Peace
Drama," The L~Vin~ Ag~, Boston, The Living Age Co., CCCVII, November 13, 19~0, ;) 7-;) 2. Reprinted from La Revue de Geneva,
September, 1920.
-,
-25 Bailey, ~ Lost Peaoe, 44-45.
26 Treat~ ~ Versailles, Parts III and VIII.
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that of'Germany ~d hhr fellow Oentral Powers.

In'the end,

then, Wilsonian idealism oame to nought.

..

The Paris Peace Oonference remained in session
from
,
't

January 12, 1919 to the

time~~f

the German delegation on May 7.

presentation of the treaty to
An opportunity to study the

terms was given to the delegates, but all protests were futile.
~

Marshal Ferdinand Foch stood at the head of a large French army
ready to march into the Reich if the terms were rejeoted, and
so on June 28, 1919 the treaty was reluotantly signed by the representatives of the new republio in the same Hall of Mirrors at
Versailles where, in 1871, the birth of the German Empire had
taken place. 27
As soon as possible after the olosing of the, conference, Wilson sped home to Washington to induce the United States

,

Senate to aocept the Versailles Paot.

Yet, within four months

after its presentation to that august body, the Paris document
was read, revised,' and rej ected. 28

This ocourred primarily b'e-

cause the treaty and its ratification were laid open to the
evils of partisan polltlcs, themselves the result of a faotious
struggle which was being waged in the United States between the
27 Balley,.,lli Lost Peaoe, 288-303.
28 Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, New York, The Macmillan 00., 1945, passIm; George A. -Finch, 'The Treaty ofPeaoe with Germany in the United States
Senate,· International Oonoi1iation, New York, No. 153, August

1920.

'

,

forces of nationali,sm and of internationalism.
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Thus, the Amer-

ican people, weary of war and shaken by the selfish v1ndictiveness of their former

comrades-in~arm8,

.

were easily convinced

that to withdraw 1nto a smug isblation and to search out the
blessings of "normalcy· was abetter choice than to accept the
vast responsibilities bequeathed to them by the war.

Wilson

and all he stood for were quickly exchanged for a chance to •
frolic in a contented complacency while the rest of the world
struggled with the problems of peace.
This turn of events bad a profound effeot upon American relations with Germany, for, while Wilson still remained in
office for more than a year, the Al11ed-American split, 1nitiated when the second of the President's Fourteen POints ,had been
rejected by the"Br1tish, was now completed.

The path was laid

open for the United States, no longer fettered to Europe, shortly to negotiate a formal peace with the Reich, and to begin
aga1n the normal diplomatic relations which
rupted.

~he

war had inte%-

These changes did not manifest themselves for almost

two years after 1919, but during that lapse of time a distinctl
d1fferent and more friendly attitude began to be shown toward
the Reich.

Except for W11son's veto of a separate peaoe treaty

in May, 1920,29 American relations with Germany were, off1cial2S Papers Relating ~ the Foreign Relations £f the
United States, Pal'is Peaoe Oonference, Wash1ngton, D.C., United
"............

-.-~

-

-

--~

- - - - . . . . " . ..... ...""
~

...--.""""'"'~~......-.,l'"'

___
"......
___
' ;_ _ __

,

11 at least,

slo~ly

returning to normal.

One factor· which undoubtedly oontributed greatly to-

.

ward the abatement of German-Amer1can antagon1sm was the orderly and non-vindiot1ve occupat10n of the Rhineland by the troops
of the United States. .This event began with the armistioe negotiations themselves, for Artiole I of the surrender document pr
vided that the
distriots [on the left bank of the Rhine]
shall be administered by the looal authorities under the oontrol of the Allied and
United States armies of ocoupat10n.30
Th1s same document also named the spec1fic areas to be
oooupied, whioh inoluded the entire Rhineland and three bridgeheads, each eighteen miles in radius, situated east of the
Rhine river'at Mainz, Ooblenz, and Oologne.

A neutral zone of

s1x miles was to be left between the Allied occupied areas and
the rest of Germany.31
America, then, beoame one of the ohief oocupying powers in the Reich, and consequently was foroed to oontinue her
presenoe in Europe long after the war.

Designed a8 the unit

to hold the Rhineland was the newly organized Third Army under
States Government Printing Office, 1947, XIII, 15-16. Wilson's
veto message can be found in House Dooument 799, 66 Cong., 2nd
Sess10n.
;SO Ibid., 763.
31 Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies ~
Battlefields in Euro~, Washington, D.C. 1 U.S. Government PrintIng 01'£ioe, '1'9'3"8, 49. See map on page 44 of this thesis.
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the oommand of Maj,or General Joseph '1'., Dickman.

,
"

The advanoe
,

of these troops was so regulated that entranoe

w~a

made into

.

cities in Luxembourg almost upon the heels of the evaouating
." - -

ZONE OF AMERIOAN OOCUPA'1'ION: 1919-1923
"

B~LG\UM

T+l\RD
-ARMY
SteoNO

--ARMY

German soldiers.

Beginning its maroh six days after the surren-

der, the oooupation army reaohed the German frontier on November 23; by Deoember 9, leading units had already taken up positions on the Rhine.

-

The river itself was orossed on

th~

13th

45

sO that the

oooupy the bridgehead assigned to
•
f
them beyond the oity of OOblenz. 32
Within one month after .the great surrender United
Amerioans~ight

St'ates forces were in'

complet~

;

control of their seotor in Ger-

many and were ready to take up their duties as directed by
Marshal Fooh, supreme commander in Europe.
self was greeted in some places rather
others more enthusiasm was shown.
the first spots to be
"glowering
flags, no

mien~"

entered~

sullenly~

In Trier

while in

(Treves)~

•

one of

the doughboys were met with a

as one report put

it~

and there were "no

no tears. It was just such a reception as only the boche could give. n33 The soldiers themoheers~

no

The occupation it-

smiles~

selves had "nothing of the popular oonception of a oonquering
.
army about them,n but yet were 'solemn-taoed

lads~

business-

like and quiet, and above all~ ready for whatever was to come. u3
At Ooblenz the reoeption was Bomewhat

different~

1n that city less want prevailed, and oonsequently the

for

troop~

were met by "smiling delegations [of] pretty girls (who] waved
hands and handkerch1efs." 35 In add1t10n, the mayor of that oit
32
Histor~

-mi9,

~.,

489.

33 II TrooprJ40vements Under the Armistioe ~" Current
Mafiaz1ne, New York Times Publishing 00., IX~ January,

t.

t:;,

15.

34

~.,

16.

;,)5

~.,

17.

f
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bad issued a proolamation forbidding all aots of disoourtesy
and

violenoe~

and ordering suoh assistanoe

be aocorded the Americans.

as

was ',possible to

.

The Germans tended tD some plaoes to sneer at the
Yankee oocupiers, although in the smaller towns the men were
well treated.

The Volkszeitung of Mayen, where the Third Army

established its first headquarters, said of the troops as

e~

ly:as mid-December, 1918, that they were
well behaved~ their interoourse with the
people is oorreot, and we willingly admit
that the Americans are good fellows. aS
The Rhineland oocupation, of oourse, was an interAllied
fore~

operation~

and not entirely Amerioan in nature.

There-

the ohief oommander remained Marshal Ferdinand Fooh, who

was striot but not harsh in his treatment of the German populaoe.

No troops exoept offioers were billeted on the local in-

habitants~37

and every oare was taken to lighten the burdens of

these people.

When the troops had been in position for some \

time~

ourfews were lifted by the looal oommanders, and telephone

communioation with the rest of Germany was allowed.

Mail regu-

lations, too, were shortly relaxed, but meetings, politioal and
otherwise were rather striotly oontrolled exoept where they took
36

~. ~

loS.

37 "Agreement with Reiard to the Military Oooupation
of the Territories of the Rhine,' Foreign Relations, Paris peace
Conference, XIII, 766-767.
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the torm 01' ohUroh gatherings.

Above all, groups of BOlsheviks

that were enoountered .were usually disbanded, tor no other
I"

government than that of Ebert and Soheidemann was reoognized • ~8

.

All in all, great taot was thus shown in not interfering
with
I
the ordinary life of the people, beoause this added to the gen~

eral painlessness of the whole oooupation.

As one writer put

it:
American oontrol is the mildest oonoeivable,
or in any case far less than that of the
Belgians at Aix an~:JUlloh and even more tolerant than that of the Frenoh at Mayence • e
•
e
The Americans always say that they cherish
absolutely no hatred for Germany, and their
atti tude oonfirms this • e. • .39
Reports show that the Rhinelanders were never duly
opposed to the American oooupation,40 tor they oould see that
it was only of temporary duration.

Moreover, the troops were

better liked than the Frenoh or British, for they not only sbar
their luxuries -- newspapers, magazines, sweets and such -with the population, but also spent large amounts of money in'
the oountry.

Too, the labor problem was partly alleviated by

the presence of Amerioan forces, for numerous Germans were hire
by the occupiers.

Thus, while four thousandijobless Germans

38 Gregory Mason, "How the Allies Govern Oocupied
Germany," 1he Outlook, New York, The Outlook 00., CXXI, April 2,

1919, 558-5~.

;;9 "German Impressions of Amerioan Troops," The LivFebruary 22, 1919, 455-456.
--- --40 Elbert F. Baldwin,"The American Forces in Germany," The Outlook~ OXXII, August 27, 1919, 635-636.
ing
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wandered the streets in January, 1919, only one out of ten was
without work by the middle of April. 41

Finally,.the Americans
.

served as a fine protective

de~ioe

I

,

for the Rhenish inhabitants

against the dreaded rule of the Bolsheviks, so that when the
army was preparing to leave, the Germans aotually requested that
it remain. 42
On the whole, then, the Rhineland oocupation was not
only a sucoessful endeavor, but also an indirect boon to a renewed Amerioan friendship with the Reich.

Certainly there was

little vindiotiveness on the part of Americans in Germany, and
the temporary nature of the sojourn was plainly indicated by
the oontinued dwindling of the oocupying force.

Too, an oppor-

tunity was provided for both Yanks and "Boche" to see eaoh
other in a new light, and while disagreements and unpleasant occurrances were not unoommon, samplings from eaoh of the two

,

nations were given a ohance to dispel many of the misoonoeptions
\

whioh had evolved during the war.

Many doughboys for the first

time saw the Germans as real human beings, and not as the beastial figments of propaganda, so that they oould say, as one aotually did, that:

41

Ibid •
............

42 ForeifI Relations, Paris Peaoe Conference, XIII,
777; 1922, II, 214- 15.
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.

I

The war has made us belieye that foroe is the
only language a Boche understands. But the
Rhinelander;at least may have been slo,,~y learning another .43 ' .
,
The American foroes remained in Germany only until
.'--

the beginning of 1923, when they were removed entirely.
nO

Since

quota, either in time or personnel, had been agreed upon for

.

the occupation, it is not surprising to note that the original
body of two hundred fifty thousand soldiers had fallen to
twelve thousand by January, 1920. 44

Six months earlier the

Third Army itself had been dissolved, leaving only a small contingent of men known as the IlAmerican Forces in Germany," a
constantly dwindling unit which remained on the Rhine about
three years.

The final withdrawal was hastened by the Senate's

rejection of the Versailles Treaty, the separate peace 'made
with Germany in 1921, and by dissatisfaotion both with French
and Belgian politioal maohinations and with Amerioan difficulties in reoeiving a just share of reparations payments to covet
the oost of the occupation. 45
Aooordingly, on Maroh 22, 1922 Seoretary of War John

w.

Weeks instructed the oommanding general in the Rhineland to
43

776.

44

Baldwin, -American Foroes,· 636.
Foreign Relations, Paris Peaoe Conferenoe, XIII,

45 D.H. Miller, U Cost of Amerioan 'l'roops on the
Rhine," Curr~nt liisto~l' XVI, July, 1922, 614-616; Foreign~
lations, 1922, 218-234; 1923, II, 110-192.
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withdraw the Amer10an ,troops before June 30. 48
protests not only from the Frenoh,

Brit1sh~

"

This order drew

1

and 2elgians, but

also from the Germans themselves who claimed that the politioal
effects of a oomplete withdrawal "would be to the detriment of
Germany," and therefore made an "urgent request to the American
Government not to withdraw."4?

Oonsequently~ on June 3 the

Reich was informed that a token force of one thousand soldiers
would be left at Ooblenz nfor the time being. n48 Even these
troops were evacuated about seven months later when French seizure of the Ruhr became imminent.

The American zone was formally turned over to the Frenoh at n~on on January 27~ 1923. 49
Another factor whioh greatly influenced the return of
German-American harmony, and one of the most soul-stirring episodes in the early post-war period, was the extensive aid provided for the starving German population by the people of the
United States during 1919 and after. 50

These years were espeo-

ially trying for the Reioh, for when the great conflict finally
46
47
48
49

Foreign Relations, 1922, II, 212.
Ibid., 213-216.
~., 218.
~., 1923, II, 192-193.
50 While it is true that most or these prOVisions we~
paid for by the Germans, it is doubtful if they would have received enough aid to survive nad it not been for the generosity
of Americans.

.'

,

51
ended, the food situation there was more than desperate.

After

,

four years of oontinual warfare and of the Allied . blookade,
meat oonsumption was down to one-seventh of its no~al amount,
,

;

fat.s were reduced by t,wo-third-s, and sugar, eggs, potatoes, and
milk had all but disappeared. 51 As a result, the unbroken monotony of bulky, non-varying, unappetizing food had brought insidious destruction upon the German people and on their morale';
The degree of want might be brought out more vividly
'if

the statements are given of several nutritional experts whose

duty it was to asoertain as
food in the Reich.

~xaotly

as possible the need for

The following is a.declaration by Dr. J.E.

Johannsson, professor of physiology at the Carolinian Institute
in Stockholm, and the Swedish government's expert on food problems:
Signs of demoralization and dissolution of
sooial bonds can be noticed, but over it all
the food shortage rules as an almighty factor.
After all seen and heard during our journey,
it is the firm conviotion of both of us that
Germany is in urgent need of supply. through
import. 52
In a similar manner, Professor Ernest H. Starling,
among other things the British delegate to the Allied Food Commission, reported:
51 Sidney Brooks, Amerioa and GermanI: 1918-1925,
New York, The Macmillan Company, 1925-;-ro-ii.
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The impression we have received is that the
nation of Germany 1s broken, both 1n body
and in spirit. Even, . if the adverse cond1tions as regards food were removed w1tttin
the next few months, even years of good
feeding will be necessary before the people
are to start to he~~th and efficiencY.53
Finally, Dr. Alonzo E. Taylor, a member of the War
Trade Board as food expert during the American partiCipation in
the war, asserted:
Assuming that Germany bad enough food to go
to the next harvest on the present ration
(which she has not), it would not be wise or
merciful or just to keep her on that ration
either for the purpose of saving money for
herself or any other reason • • • • Under
all Circumstances, it 1s clear that food
should be shipped in [to Germany] as needed
in a correot nutritional program. Raw materials should be shipped at once, for the repair of domestio depletion • • • • Delay is
injurious to the Germans and to the Allies •.
It is the old problem of penology on a national soale. Shall an offender expiate by
solitary oonfinement on bread and water or
work off a fine on the stone pile? Involved
are both morals and utilities. 54
It is easy to see, then, that immediate aid to Germany was an urgent necessity, not only in the humanitarian sens
but for the purpose also of forestal11ng the sucoess of Bolshevism,among the desperate populace.

The strength of the Sparta-

cists -- German Bolshevists -- lay muoh in the disoontent produced by empty bellies, for a Brooks puts it:
53

Ibid., 14.

54

~.,

17-19.

,

53

.

..

,

A small .amount of food ought to be sent to
Germany without oonditions if it is hoped
to maintain order there~ otherwise oiro~~ .
stanoes growing from laok of food will be
fert11e for the dootrines of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebkne6ht of the Spartaous '
group who will let ·hell loose if not ourbed.
There is a frightful ourrent of agitation
under an app~entlY peaoeful situation. 55 1

.;

i

t,

The ourrent of agitation spoken of was oertainly true,

•

for street fighting between German oommunists and sooialists
was a daily ooourrenoe, espeoially in Stuttgart,

Dresden~ ~

burg, and Berlin, the last of whioh was finally placed under
martial law in January, 1919.

Again, for example, a general
,

strike ooourred 1n Leipzig and a demonstration took plaoe in
Bremen on January 10. Allover Germany orime was
roads lacked engines and

fue1~

r~pant~

rail

and industry in general 'sutfered

I

from an insuffioiency of metals, ootton, rubber, and ooal.

The

degree of severity was admitted in the Deutsohe Allgemeine

~

~

on January 13, when a statement was issued to the effect

that
[i]mpoverished Germany oan only be reconstruoted by the labor of all. A very brief
interval stands between the German nation
and oomplete qOllapse. 56

standing."
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These

co~dit10ns,

then, constituted not only an econ-

om10 menaoe to Europe, but also Germany's
ployable ex-soldiers -- in
presented a

extr~e

jobless~

her unem-

need of food and clothing --

.serious political and social peril.

ill

Yet, there

was one great nat10n from which might come the wherewithal to
stem the tide of starvation and to save the day for those who •
were resisting the Bolsheviks.

That nation was the United

states,5? offioially an enemy oountry, but one to which innumerable Germans looked for aid -- probably more earnestly than
was suspected in this country.

A.-reliable observer" is quoted

by Brooks as saying:
All Germany's hopes today rest on America.
.
The apathy and despondency O~ the people are,
however, aggravated by the fear (that] the
Americans will not be able to oarry their
program through.58

And again:
The mass of people, untrained and inexperienced
in construotive politiCS, are waiting to be
told what to do. And they are looking to America to tell them. If they could be assured unambiguously that they would be helped with food
and raw materials it would suoceed in establishing
stable government there. It would sound the
knell of Bolshevism 1n Germany • • • .59
57 It is sign1fioant to note, however, that American
aid came completely from non-official souroes. None of the one
hundred million dollar oongressional appropriation of February,
1919 was allotted for German relief.
58 Brooks, 24-25.
59 Ibid.

-

55

The attitude ,then, that aid would be forthcoming
from the United States was rather prevalent in the Reich, es-

.

peoially when America announced her intention to participate
in solving the problem of

pea~e.

In fact, Brooks,

~eferring

to the Versailles Treaty, claims that
refusal to sign might bave rekindled antiGerman sentiment in the question of what
America might do for Germany if so disposed
came in for serious consideration and was
an important factor in the decision to signe60
The same author even goes so far as to assert that many of the
original members eleoted to the new republican government were
chosen for the1r knowledge of or influenoe in the United
States.

He says:
How important German, opinion oonsidered the
possibili ty of aid fr.om America is seen in
the 1nclusion in praotioally every oabinet
since that of the first provisional government in 1918 of some member aPPOinted because of some aff1l1at10n, some 1nterests,
some supposed 1nfluenoe w1th Amer1ca or some
personal knowledge of Amerioa.Sl
In support of the above assertion, Brooks points out

that Herr Matthias Erzberger, German Finance Minister, had directed American propaganda from Germany, and although his knowledge of this nation was meagre, the man himself was agreeable
60
61

-Ibid.,
Ibid.,

109.
113.

,.

56

and knew the

pub1101tr.

valu~'of

S1m11arly~

the first repub-

11can foreign minister, Oount Ulrioh von Brockdorff-Rantzau,
was experienoed in world
America.

affair~,

.--

and espeoially familiar with

Count Johann von Bernstorff, too, a man well known

in the United States, was in charge of the foreign Office Annex
relative to peaoe

I

and was doing work with Count Adolf

ma~ters,

Montgelas, who had an Amerioan wife.

•

Finally, Brooks declares

"upon apparently good authority· that President Ebert himself
won the eleotion from the National Assembly at Weimar beoause
of a self-assert10n that he was in a position to secure a large
loan from Amerioa immediately after the oonolusion of the
peace. 62
Whether or
say.

~ot t~ese
~:"

~

reports are true, it is'hard to
,

::

Nevertheless, there seems to be enoug~ evidenoe to indi-

oate a real note of expeotanoy in Germany with regard to the
possibility of Amerioan aid, although off1cials in the United
\

States mayor may not have known this.

It i8 oertain, however,

that the latter were oogn1zant of the general food situation
among the German

p~ople,

for in Deoember, 1919, Herbert Hoover,

head of the Un1ted States Food Administration in Europe, requested the perman government to present him with an aoourate
62

-

Ibid., 113-114.

------------------------------------------------~-------------,

157

statement of the nutrit,ional oon41 tion of that country.

When

completed, the survey _howed that cereal produots~in the Reich
had fallen to sixty-foUr per oent'of the pre-war consumption

.

mark, meats stood at a level
about twelve per oent.

o~

eighteen per oent, and fats at

As a result, the entire German popu-

lace was close to twenty per cent underweight, and the death
rate in 1917 had reaohed a figure of nine and one-half per cent
over that of births. S3 The reliability of these statistics had.
been carefully oheckedby a special mission sent to Berlin consisting of Dr. AlonzO E. Taylor and Dr. Vernon Kellogg, so that
their accuraoy oould not be doubted.
Armed with this information, then, Hoover wrote to
President Wilson at the Peaoe Oonferenoe:
Viewing the German Empire from a food point of
view, there will. be no hope of saving these
people from starvation if BOlshevist activities
extend over the empire in a similar manner to
Russia, with its sequent breakdown in commercial distribution and in the oontrol and distribution of existing food • • • • We must maintain a liquidity of the existing food stooks in
Germany over the whole Empire, or again the situation will become almost unsolvable • • • • It
would appear to me, therefore, that some announoement with regard to the food policies of Germany is oritioa11y neoessary, and at onoe • • • .64
63 Frank M. Surfaoe and Raymond L. Bland, American
Food in the World War and Reconstruotion Period, Stanrord Un1verSity,-california;-Stanford U. Press, 1931, 191. This figure
Was even larger in 1918 ,due to the influenza epidemio.
64 Brooks, 25-27.
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Suoh a ,step.was necessary not only beoause the armistice agreement had provided for the oontinuanoe

~n

of the Allied blockade, but also beoause the Food
was fully prepared tq go into immediate
supplies.

aotio~

operation

~dministratio

in distributing

All during the month of November plans had been in

the prooess of perfeotion for a speedy distribution of food
materials to Europe, with this organization purohasing one hundred twenty thousand tons of flour and from thirty to forty mil
lion pounds of pork produots. 65

These were already on their wa

to Frenoh ports for re-oonsignment or storage.

Also, the Unite

States Grain Corporation had been organized with a oapital of
one hundred fifty million dollars to oarry out the oommercial
transaotions for the Food Admini.stration, and was now at hand t
attend to the immediate shipment of food.

Finally, a Paris

headquarters had been set up whioh was fully prepared to distri
ute relief "on a scale never before attempted in the history ,of
war or famine. n66
Despite these careful preparations, the aotual task
of provisioning Germany still assumed gigantio proportions, for
co-operation both from the Allies and the Germans was almost
negligible.

Hoover and his staff were not only faced with the

65

~.,

S.

66

~.,

6.

,
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arduous assignment of ,proouring and finanoing tmmense quanti)

ties of food stuffs, but were also saddled with the
.. near impossibilities of either removing or penetrating the Allied
blockade, and of wresting the· German fleet from its owners to
he'lp in the great task of transportation.

The two latter prob-

lems proved sO diffioult to solve that muoh valuable time was
consumed where aotion was vitally neoessary.
The blookade issue originated in November, 1918 when
Marshal Foob, taking no risks with the Germans, oaused it to be
plainly stated in the armistioe agreement that the deadly ring
of vessels around the Reioh was to be maintained "unohanged,
and [that] all German merohant ships found at sea [were to] remain liable to oapture. IIS?

Tbese provisions and the intention

of Amerioa to provide the hungry Germans with food were not
only oontradiotory, but the maintenanoe of the blookade remaine
an artifioial barrier restrioting the normal working of eoono.m10 laws.

The blockade, then, had either to be removed alto-

gether or oo-ordinated in some way with relief and reoonstruotion measures.

Complexities showed the latter to be impossible,

although a somewhat workable 1iason was temporarily effected be
tween the B100kade Council and the Food Seotion of the Supreme
~

-

67 "Oonditions of an Armistioe with Germany," Amer
Journal 2! International ~, 1919, XIII, 102.

60

Eoonomio Oounoil.
The blookade as a whole was fought by Herbert Hoover
from the very start.

ror example. on the first day of January,

1919, he advised President Wilson that the raising

of this ob-

struotion was far more important to the eoonomic reoovery of
all Europe than was its ma1ntenance in naval and military val.
ues.

He d1d not, however. propose the abandonment of the

blookade prior to peaoe, but merely urged an open1ng whioh
would perm1t the passage of certa1nagreed oommodities for 1mport and export.

He further believed that there should be

agreed-upon avenues of

ored1t~loperations,

ohannels of trade and

oommunioat1on, and tbat:oertain enemy ooean ships should be
used for transport" serv10e. 68 In addition, both Hoover and
Lord Robert Oeoil, member of the Br1t1sh Peaoe Oommiss1on,
thought that Germany should be allowed the opportunity to get
re-exported food through those neutral nations

no~th

of her, a

proposition whioh reoeived no favorable approval from the Supreme Council of Supply and Rel1ef. G9
The problem of neutral oontrol thereupon entered into the general food pioture, for it was "apparent that not only
was trade between the Reioh and the Allies hampered by the
68

Brooks, 34.

69

~.
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blockade" but also was , that of the Germans with neutral countries.
On this pOint Hoover opined to Wilson:

.

We have no justifioation in humanity or politics in debarring neutrals from buying all the
food they wish for t-heir oonsumption now that
we have ample suPPlies.70
He also addressed the Frenoh, British" and Italian food ministers" Boret" Clynes" and Crespi:
I am direoted to inquire if you will not reoommend to your Governments:
That all restrictions upon neutral trading be
at onoe removed in [oertain] commodities.
That no objeotion be raised by the Allied
Governments to direot or indireot sale and
transportation to enemy oountries or to necessary finanoial transaotions involved. 7l
Hoover's words were in Vain, however, for both the
Frenoh and the Italian governments perSistently refused to oomply with his pleas.

No attempt whatsoever was made to lift the

blockade before the formal signing of the Versailles Peaoe Trea~,

although late in April, 1919, permission was given for the

Germans to import foods on their own aooount.

Such trade, never
,

theleas" was still so hampered by a mass of intrioate regulations that Hoover was moved to say:
We feel • • • from an Amerioan point of view
that the refusal of the Allies to aooept
70

Ibid., Hoover to Wilson, January 31, 1919.

71

-Ib1d."

~8.

as
(the lifting of the blookade] leaves them
with the total respons1bility for what is
now impend1ng • • • • We do not believe thet
blookade was ever an effeotive instrument
to foroe peaoe; it 1s effeot1ve, however,
to foroe Bolshevism:72
The other great task oonneoted with the German nutrit10nal s1tuation whioh faoed Amerioa and the Allies in the
armistioe period was that of seouring from the .Republio what

•

remained
of the Imperial merohant -marine for aid in transport,
"

ing food suppl1es to Europe.

This was neoessary beoause 1mmed-

1ately after the war a shortage instead of a surplus of shipping existed for transport duty among the Allied nat10ns and
the l1berated peoples whioh they were supplying.

The praotioa-

b1l1ty of us1ng German vessels for such purposes, especially
sinoe the Reioh was likewise to profit by it, was almost everywhere reoognized.

As Oolonel Edward M."House, the intimate

friend of President Wilson, said:

,

It would appear to me to be entirely just
that the enemy shipping in oonsideration of
relief of enemy territory should be plaoed
in the general food servioe of all the populations released from the enemy yoke as well
as enemy territorY.73

j

Consequently, at tIle Seoond Armistioe Oonvention, hell
at Tr1er (Trevea) on January 16, 1919, the following provisions

--------72 Ib1d., 41.
73

Ib1d., 60.

"

\',
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were put, into ArtioleVIII of the new surrender agreement:
In order to insure the food supply of Germany and the rest of Europe, the German~
Government will take all neoessary measures to put the whole German merohant marine and fleet, for the duration of the
'
armistioe, under the-oontro1 and under the
flags of the Allied Powers and of the United
States who shall be assisted by a German delegate • • • • This agreement in no wise prejudices the final disposition of these ships.?4
The urgency Of the transportation, however, merely •
led to a oontroversy with certain representatives of the new
German' Republic.

Unaware that the above olause had oome from

the Amerioans themselves, these individuals feare,d that this
was merely a scheme by the European Allies to get their hands
on the German merchant marine.

Therefore, they apparently oon-

sidered the possibility of seouring a better. bargain with
. the
Allies by playing upon Amerioan sentimentality.

At the same

time, of course, this proved to be an exoellent method of testing the mettle of the United States in its assooiation with its
comrade nations.
Thus, for some months no move was made by the Germans
to turn over their merohant fleet to the

A~lles,

even though

such transferenoe had been arranged for at a meeting in Spa, Be
gium on February 6, 1919.

Here Allied de1egat'es under Admiral

59.
Tne full text of this agreement is
printed in "Conventions Prolonging the Armistioe with Germany,"
Journal of International Law, 1919, XIII, 388-392.
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Sir George Prioe

Weble~

Hope and representatives of Germany

un~

dar Unterstaatssekretar Edler von Braun had oome to
.. an allcovering agreement regarding at once the provision of food for
the Reich, the transfer of German merchant ships for transportation purposes, and seouring of oredits for further purchases
of needed supplies.

All this was now entirely disregarded.

In the long interim, however, the Germans oontinued to such an
extent to beg suooor for their oountrymen75 that Admiral Hope
was foroed to apply the dictum: Bo ships, no food!76

To this

demand Braun finally aoquiesoed, but continued to hold out for a
definite agreement whioh would guarantee an adequate supply of
nourishment for his people before the vessels were surrendered.
His own words were that he was
of the opinion that the delivery of the German merohant fleet must begin from the moment
wben reviotualling of Germany with foods was
secured. 77
The Unterstaatssekretar emphasized this point by
the German ration might otherwise have to be

c~t,

ola~ing

that

an event whio

undoubtedly would have grave "political and eoonomio consequences. n78
given.

I

I

75

SUrfaoe and Bland, 189-300.

75
77

Brooks, 65.
~.

78

~.
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On Maroh 5, the German and Allied delegates agreed'

.

that

subjeot to immediate delivery of the German
merohant fleet, it is the 1ntent10n of the
Assooiated Government~ to fa01litate the provision1ng of Germany from month to month subject to the decision of the Supreme War Council as to quantities and cond1tions.
79

t·

The Weimar government, nevertheless, rejeoted the offer onoe
more, oontending that it could not
put the German merohant fleet at the moment
under oontrol of the Associated governments
without the food supply of Germany being assured • • • -SO
Negotiations were thus broken off until late Maroh, 1919, when
faced with the same naval surrender plus an added burden of

de~;

positing with the Direotor General of Relief suffioient gold
to oover the value of any food reoeived, the Reioh representatives finally oonoeded defeat and signed away their sh1Ps.Sl
By this same Brussels Agreement, however, the Germans
obtained permiss10n to purohase and import three hundred thou\

sand tons of breadstuffs and seventy thousand tons of fats~G
from Amer10a and the Allies, and any fprther amounts from other

-

79

Ibid., 67.
80 Ibid.
81 Surfaoe and Bland, 189-200. Cites Supreme Eoonomic CounCil, ~ Dooument 128, Appendix II, Paris, 1919.

-

82

Ibid., 195.

,

ss
nations for whioh payment oould be made.

Reimbursement to the

first necessarily bad to be made in gold marks, redeemable

.

later, and placed in banks of Allied or neutral countries.
in all, the amount deposited

in such treasuries

All

reached one

billion, fifty-five million marks (two hundred fifty million
dollars), slightly less than half of which represented cash

•
sales by the American Relief Administration during the Armistice
period. 83
As a final word on this matter' of provisioning Germany
in the years that followed World War I, it might be well to ment10n the outstanding services performed by independent welfare
organizations in the United States, most notable of which was
the Sooiety of Friends, or Quakers.

The latter-mentioned group

-- under the name of the Amerioan Friends Service Oommittee -began its humanitarian work soon after the Armistice, but due
to lack of co-operation from the Allies and to Amerioan pUblio
opinion, 84 they found their task of feeding the Germans a very
diffioult one.

They did not let SUOh previous ill-will deter

them, however, but rather continued to pursue their labors,
saying:

-

83

~.

84

Ibid., 198.
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[The] Friends,are not disloyal to their oountry, bu~-they desire ~o be sup~emely loyal to
the spirit of Jesus Christ who commands us to
love those whom we oall .' enemies' • 85
.In November, 1919

Herb~rt

Hoover asked the Friends

to take on \ the responsibility "of ohild-feeding in Germany.
Said he:
,

I

J

Despite the suffering and losses imposed upon the Amerioan people through the old Ger. man government, I do not believe for a moment that the real American would have any
other wish than to see any possible service
done in protection of child life wherever it
is in danger. We have never fought with women and children • • • • I particularly turn
to you, beoause I am anxious that efforts of
this kind should not become the subject of
political propaganda. The undoubted probity,
ability and American character of the Quakers
for genera~ions will prevent such use being,
made for your service, and for this reason I
propose that the funds at my disposal should .
be devoted exclusively to your support.~6
The original mission which answered Mr. Hoover's call
oonsisted of fifteen volunteers who set out for Germany in January, 1920. 87 By the end of February they had started their \
merciful work and by July had placed over six hundred thirty-tw
thousand ohildren under their care.

A year later these figures
had risen to almost one million twenty-seven thousand. 88

-

85
86
87
88

Brooks, 145.
Ibid., 147.
Later enlarged to forty thousand. Ibid., 154-159.
SUrfaoe and Bland, 198-199.

•

68
Funds
ed by

~he

~or

the Friends' work in Germany were oollect-

European Relief Oouncil, formed by

early part of 1920.

Mr.~Hoover

in the

Among the oontributors were 11sted the

Fr1ends themselves, the Amer1can Red Cross, the Federal Council
of Churohes of Ohrist in Amerioa, the Joint Distr1but10n Oomm1ttee for Jewish War Sufferers, the Kn1ghts of Columbus, the
National Catho110 Welfare Council, and both the Young Men's and
Young Women's Christian Associations.

A total of twenty-nine

m1llion dollars was colleoted for German relief by February,
1921,89 while another two million was volunteered by the Amer1can pub11c through a Food Draft System. 90 The German government, by means of the Deutsoher Zentralausschuss fUr die Aus---~.....-,

1andsh1lfe, also a1ded this agency by add1ng oons1derable other
funds,9l by fuxnish1ng free transportation, and by charging no
tar1ff duty on 1mported food.
The Friends, after due oonsideration,92 remained in

•

the German homeland through 1922, feeding for the most part
children and expectant mothers, and distributing some 1,400
bales of clothing wherever it was needed.

!

I

They f1nished the1r

89 Brooks, 150.
90 Ib1d., 163-165.
91 Two m11lion two hundred thousand dollars.
and Bland, 198-199; Brooks, 154-159.
92 Brooks, 159-161.
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work and left the. Reioh that same year, only to return a short
time later under the direction of Major General Henry T. ,Allen,
former commander of the American Army of Occupation in Germany.
This last mission continued its relief work through the harvest
year of 1923 and 1924.
In general, then, the saorifioes and contributions of
the Friends, as well as those of all the other auxiliary orgahizations, might well be considered as integral parts, of those
relations which conoerned the German and American peoples in
the trying years of the post-war era.

The value of suoh inter-

relations in renewing friendly ties between the United States
and the Reich cannot, of oourse, be acourately measured, but
from the expressions of gratitude which came from persons of
prominenae in Germany, the influenoe in this regard must have
been oonsiderable indeed.

Thus, as Herman MUller, ohanoellor at

the time the Friends left Europe, put it:

-

I wish • • • ,to express to the distributors
of this relief, as well as to all those in
the United states who have oontributed in
the oolleotion of funds, how fully the German people appreoiate this work of brotherly love. • • • For the oontinuation of this
relief, which has been made possible by the
co-operation of so many olasses of the American population and which is being carried
forward in the spirit of true justioe and a
brotherly love and a goodness knowing no
boundaries, I wish a rich blessing.93
93

-Ibid.,

176-177.

,

70

And again, Dr. JO,seph 'Wirth, the German Ohancellor in 1921,

..

wrote:

Any form of government'may continue if it
can offer to the people the most necessary
means of existence..- In this respect child
feeding has greatly helped our present
government • • • • It is not too much to say
that all such work has helped, in a way to
prevent within the mass of the German people
a still greater growth of despondency. In
this respect the Ohild feeding operation has
decidedly counteracted the spread of BOlshevism. • • • [The share of all Americans] in
this work has given room to hope that this
memorable aotion of oharity may soon be followed by co-operation along economic lines
between the United States and Germany • • • •
The never-to-be-forgotten merit of the Amerioan benefaotors consists in oreating in the
German people a mental tranquillity and in
reduoing their feeling of being forsaken by
the whole world.94
In summary, then, dur ing the early years after World •
War I, the antagonistic attitudes left as a residue from that
gigant10 struggle were slowly being replaced by a new and more
friendly outlook.

The Allied-Amer1oan break, the 1nfamy of ,Ver

sailles, the Rhineland Oooupat10n, and above all, the great
gesture of meroy shown by private citizens 1n providing food fo
a starVing German populace -- all these served to show that, un

offioially at least, the two peoples were well on their way toward a fruitful era of peaoe and harmony.
94

Ibid., 177-178.

How this same trans-

,
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formation was oarr,ied out along lines of diplomaoy and oommeroe
will be the subjeot of Ohapter III.
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OHAPTER III

OFFIOIAL PEACE AND
..

"

BETTER BUSINESS

The gradual rapprochement, whioh in the previous cha
ter was shown to have developed between the peoples of

German~

and the United States shortly after the First World War, did no
immediately become reflected in the offioial relations of those
countries.

While for all praotical purposes a true peace had

been effected between these nations at the Armistice convention
of late 1918, no suoh status was recognized by the respective
governments concerned.

As a matter of official record, a form-

al state of war still existed between the two powers as long as
no definitive peace treaty was conoluded by them, or no act of
Congress was made to repeal the declaration of hostilities
,

'I

framed in April, 1917.

!

Americans and oitizens of the German Reioh, then, remained teohnical enemies long after the Armistioe, and thus no
early attempt was made to re-establish those diplomatio ties
which had formerly existed between them.

In fact, the matter

VIas totally ignored for almost a full year after the cessation
of military action.

It had, indeed, been inadvisable up to

this time for the United States to send a representative into
72

73
the Reich to handle its affairs, not only beoause there still
was hope that the Senate might aooept the TreatYwof Versailles,
but also beoause no suoh preoedent had been set by any of the
other Allied powers.
When, in Ootober, 1919, no ratifioation of the Versailles paot seemed even remotely probable, a representative of
the Commission to Negotiate the Peaoe wrote from Paris to Sedretary of state:
Owing to the great dependenoe of Germany
on the United States for its neoessities, present and future, and to the faot that we are
still more trusted in Germany than any other
nation, we are in a position readily to establish pOints or [oontaot] whioh will aid
in the rehabilitation of Germany and indireotly in that of the whole of Europe_
l
.
He further noted that, while the appointment of a oharge or a
diplomatio agent might stlll be impraotioable, it might be well
to name a oommissioner who would prove most valuable in supporting and enoouraging the new German government, in observir.g the
the politioal, finanoial, and eoonomio situation in the Reich,

,

and in oontrolling and reporting the aotivitles of oommeroial
travelers in Germany.

2

1

Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 242.
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Sinoe seleotion of suoh a commissioner had to be made
with a 'great deal of care, a whole week passed before Secretary
of state Lansing wrote baok to the Peace Oommission:

.--

I cannot think of anyone in the service more
suitable to act for. usili t.his capaoi ty than
Ellis (Loring] Dresel.3
Dresel was an experienced diplomatist who had been an agent of

•

the state Department in Germany before the war,4 and was in Paris on duty at the peace conferenoe.

Thus, upon Lansing's recom-

mendation, he was instructed on November 5 to proceed to Berlin
under the title of Amer10an Oomm1ss10ner.

In th1s capaoity he

was not to be oons1dered a "diplomatio officer accorded to Germany," but was merely to reoe1ve 1nformat10n of 1nterest and importance on oondit10n and op1nions of the German state, and to
ascertain as far as possible the aspirations of foreign governments in the new republio. 5
i

The time of Dresel's arr1val in the German oapital,wa

!

I,
•

later changed so as not to be misoonstrued by the Allies or appear to be a lone-handed move by the United States.

As a safe-

guard, it was planned that he should not start for the Reich be
fore the signing of a protoool reaff1rm1ng Germany's peace obli
3

-

~.,

243.

4 Who's Who in Amerioa, Ohioago, A.N. Marquis and Co.
1922, XIII,964.
-----5 Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 244.

I,
"I,.

?5

gations, 6 for an ,earlier arrival might enoourage the Germans in
what was feared to be their polioy of "driving a--wedge between
the Allies."? However, as the year progressed, the need for
Dresel became so acute that he was finally dispatched from Paris
to Berlin on January 14, 1920, and arrived there to take up his
duties three days later.

Here he remained for almost two years

•

in the capacity of commissioner, oontinuing to handle American
affairs in the interim period before formal diplomatio relations
were restored between the United States and Germany in 1921.
In November of that year his status was ohanged to that of
charge d' affaires,8 a post whioh .,he retained until relieved by
Alanson B. Houghton, appointed Ambassador to the Reioh in April,
1922. 9
Negotiations for a formal peace between the American
and German governments, apart from that established by the Treaty of Versailles, were initiated as early as Deoember 20, 1919.
Thus, even while the Paris pact was still being bantered about
in the Senate, that august group had already heard Senator Philander O. Knox of Pennsylvania submit a resolution deolaring

1920.

-

6 Protoool to the Treaty of Peaoe, signed January 10,
Foreign Relations, Paris Peaoe Oonferenoe, XIII, 743-754.
7 Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 245.
8 Ibid., 1921, 3~
9 Who's Who ~ Amerioa, XII, 1678.
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"That peace exists between the United States and Germany.nlO No
action was 'taken on this proposal, however, until the following
~

~

May when it was amended, passed by both houses of Congress, and
sent to President \Vilson for. -his signature.

The Chief Execu-

tive, ill and still smarting'from his Versailles defeat, vetoed
the bill, so that it was returned to Congress, where less than
the necessary two-thirds vote failed to make it law. ll
Little more was heard of the separate peace with Germany until April 12, 1921, when;the new President, Warren G.
Harding, addressed the SixtY-Seventh Congress in these words:
The United States alone among the allied and
the assooiated powers ,oontinues ina technical state of war ,against the Central Powers of
Europe. This anomalous condition ought not
to be permitted to oontinue. To establish'
the state of teohnioal peaoe without fUrther
delay, I should approve a deolaratory resolution by Congress to that effect, with the qualifioations essential to protect all our rights.
Such action would be the simplest keeping of
faith with ourselves, and could in no sense be
construed as a desertion of those with whom we
shared our saorifices in war, for these powers
are already at peaoe. 1 2
Aocordingly, Senator Knox introduoed his 1920 resolution once
again, and after some debate and amendment, it was approved on
July 1 by both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
10

':longressiona~

Senate Resolution 136, 66th Congress, 2nd Session.
Record, Deoember 20, 1919, 960.
Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference, X!!!, l~

11
12 ill!!.

J
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True to h1s word,. the' President set his name to the b1ll one
13
..
day later, t,hus mak1ng 1 t law.
Commissioner Dresel at. Berlin reoeived the announoement on July 5.

At the same-""time, however, he was requested
to ask an "authoritative and def1nite answer n14 as to whether

the German government wished to objeot to or quest10n any of the
rights aooruing to the United states in oertain seotions 15 of
the Versailles Treaty, for these provis1ons would undoubtedly
be oontained in suoh a peaoe treaty as had been 1n the prooess
of d1soussion between the Reioh and Amer10a sinoe the previous
January.

The reply arrived about two weeks later, when the

Secretary of state reoeived word that the deoision of the
Re1ohskab1nett "fully oorrespond[ed] with the views of the
Amerioan Government. nlS
As a result of this agreement, then, negotiations were
further oarried on between the two governments whioh oulminated
on August 25, 1921 in the signing in Berlin of the treaty
bet"een the United states and Germany restor1ng friendly
relat1ons. 17

13 fbial~7. Text of resolut1on on pages 18 and 19.
14 Fore1gn Relations, 1921, II, S.
15 Ibid., 5. Seotions are l1sted.
16 Ibi~., 7.
17 Ibid., 29-33. Full text given.
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BY Artiole I of this instrument, the Weimar government undertook to aooord to the United States:
all the rights, priv~leges, indemnities, reparations or advantages speoified in the • • •
Joint Resolution of the Congress • • • of July
2, 1921, inoluding all the rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United
States in the Treaty of Versailles which the
United States shall fully enjoy notwithstanding the fact that such Treaty has not been ratified,by the United Statese18
By this treaty# then, and by the resolution of July 2,
peaoe between the German and Amerioan nations was onoe more offioially restored.

It will be noted, however, that it was a

completely one-sided peaoe and one in wh10h the very essenoe of
Amerioa's post-war philosophy -- that of esoaping from international obligations -- was boldly and fully set forth.

What-

ever r1ghts the Un1ted States was to reoeive from the Versailles
dooument, that is, the retent10n until further adjustment of
seized German property# joint title with the other powers to
the former German overseas possessions, suoh finanoial deta1ls
as payment for oooupying troops# and many other privileges -these were retained.

But the duties, above all of secur1ng the

peace through oo-operation with the League of Nations -- these
were rejeoted.

America was 1ndeed partaking of the fruits of

peaoe, but was not giv1ng anyth1ng to seoure them for the future
18

Ib1d.
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As might be 'expeoted, the separate peace with the
Reich was met wi. th widely varying degrees of publ1.c approval
both in this country and in Teu1;onic Europe.

-

Even before Con-

..

gressional action was taken on the Knox resolutions, the attitude of the Democratic elements, which saw in this plan an
abandonment of the Allies, was being countered with such statements as:
A separate peaoe, coming • • • after the baffling complications caused by the deadlock
between the.President and Senate, could not,
except in the language of campa1gn bunoombe,
be oharacterized as a gross act of treason to
the nation's allies.
and
[I]t was not the purpose of the Republican Administration advocates of the Knox resolution
to embark on any projeot of separate peace with
a view to leaving the Allies in the lurch. 19
It was nevertheless agreed by ,the advocates of the
treaty that:
there is always grave danger • • • that a separate,
peaoe would further weaken those relations with
our allies which • • • had already been weakened
to a deplorable degree. Against this danger it
is peculiarly necessary to guard in view of Germany's persistent endeavor to esoape her obligations under the Treaty of Versailles.zO
19 "Make the Separate Peaoe Harmless," wee~~ Revie]!,
New York, National Weekly Corporation, IV, April l~l . 1, ~30.
20

llli.

80

As a remedy for

this~

the suggest10n -- not ent1rely heeded --

..

was made to

1ncorporate into the resolution a deolarat10n which • • • should embody [a note
plac1ng] upon Germany the respons1b111ty
for the war, and the ob11gation to make reparation to the full extent of her ability.
• • • An aff1rmation [also] of our support
of the finality of the settlement at Versa1l1es • • • would be of infinite value in
the present situation in Europe'2l
The controversy in the American press continued long
after the treaty was completed.

Pro-leaguers were prone to ex-

claim with the Pittsburgh Post:
Did we send two million men aoross the sea
for a peaoe treaty that would omit any reference to the principles for whioh we
fought?22 .
In this same va1n, the Memphis Commeroial Appeal remarked that
the silence of the treaty on the oauses of the war and on Germany's conduot was "apologetio, shifty, and pusillanimous." ~ ..,
Finally, oharging that the agreement aided the Germans to split
the Allies, the New York World saroastically noted:
German diplomaoy for the last two years has
recognized only one aim, which is the nullification of the Treaty of Versailles • • • •
For all the practical purposes of Berlin the
21 Ibid.
22 II A Peace of Distang1ement," Literary Digest, LXX,
September 10, 1921, 12.
23 Ibid.
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first ~edge'has been driven into the Treaty
of Versailles, and the business of wrecking
it oan be oarried on as prudenoe and opportunity dictate.24
On the other hand, the St. Paul Dispatoh saw a boon

.-

to Amerioan nationalism in the paot, for it oonsidered it to be
the ooup ~ grace to the supergovernment whioh
would have set its foot upon the oonstitutional self-sovereignty of the United States and
the ratification of the treaty will be the first
positive expression of our government to replace
the several negative evidences of our attitude
toward the surrender of sovereignty to an international assooiation.aS

•

Likewise, the New York Tribune thought that "a separate peaoe
whioh suits us [is] better than

a

joint peaoe whioh would have
tied us up to an unworkable League of Nations Covenant. n2S

And lastly, Republioan Senators Medill MoCormiok of Illinois an
Porter J. McCUmber of North Dakota appealed to Amer1ca's good
fortune in negotiating suoh a paot by saying, respeotively:
The treaty epitomizes the return to sensible
American diplomaoy and normal, national, realizable ideals. Under it Amerioa, true to her
tradition, assumes no politioal obligation in
Europe. Her economic rights are everywhere
safeguarded. 27
and

25

Ibid.
Ibid.

26

Ibid.

27

Ibid.

24
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I am very favorably .1mpressed with the treaty,
espeoially the provisions whioh reserve our
rights under the Versailles Treaty, whioh Germany has ratified without our having to ratify
it ourselves or without our having to be bound
·
by it.a8
The attitude towar"d the state Department in general,
and more speoifioally State Seoretary Oharles E. Hughes who negotiated the treaty, was likewise divided.

A word of

for

pr~ise

•

both was uttered by the Weekll Review when it opined:
[T]he impression is very real that our State
Department is again operating in ways that
the plain Amerioan oan reasily understand and
approve.
and

Mr. Wilson -- despite his • • • ideals • • •

The

~

retarded the progress of the world enormously.
Amerioans are • • • beginning to appreoiate
what a magnifioent reoord this oountry might
have made for itself at the [Peaoe Oonferenoe]
if someone of Mr. Hughes's talent and oommon
sense had been our plenipotentiary at Paris. 29
Republio, nevertheless, dubbed the Department's work as

"an affair of shears and paste pot," while the Indianapolis News
\

predioted that it would be "ratified with a feeling of relief,
but oertainly not with a feeling of pride."30
28 "Peaoe with Germany," New Republio, New York, Republio Publishing Co., XXVIII, September 7, 19~1, 30.
29 "The German Treaty," Weekly Review, V, September
3, 1921, 201-202.

30 "Peaoe with Germany," New Republio, 30; "The Peaoe
'With Germany," Current Opinion, New York, Uurrent Literature
Publishing Co., LXXX, Ootober, 1921, 413.
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On the other side of the Atlantio in Germany, almost
equally separated extremes of viewpoints were
though for different reasons.
joioedat the thought of

e~ressed,

al-

Business interests in general re

the~oommeroial

opportunities whioh

would aoorue to them with the newly deolared state of peaoe.
For example, a "German government offioial" was quoted as saying:
Business will be benefited immediately. Under
the teohnioal state of war whioh existed businessmen hesitated to engage in oontraots with
alien enemies. There was nothing agreed relative to oommeroial treaties, nor the personnel
of the German mission sent to the United States,
but [now] we will send our ablest men.3l
Similarly, Vorwarts agreed that
The continuance of a formal state of war very
seriously hampered Germany's eoonomio reoonstruction. For this reason alone the signing
of the treaty is an event of the utmost joyous import for GermanY-33
Opinions oonflicted rather strongly, however, in regard to the benefits of the Berlin Paot over that of Versailles.
\

One view maintained by the Deutsohe Allgemeine Zeitung speoifioally favored its om'ission of "a whole series of oppressive
oonditions." 33

Too, some Germans saw in the Amerioan treaty a

31 "The Peaoe that Germany Won," Literary Digest,
LXX, September 10, 1921, 18.
32

Ibid_

33

Ibid.

64

veritable blow at the' Paris Diktat, while others, taking a mid-

..

dle position, asserted:

The United states makes numerous reservations
and insists upon the ·advantages • • • of the
Treaty of Versailles, but we [the Germans] will
continue to act frankly upon the supposition
that, although insisting upon 100 per cent of
that Versailles Treaty, the United States probably will demand the actual execution of less
than 50 per cent of, the Treaty's provisions. 34
•
Finally, the more radical element v.io1ently opposed
the paot.

This group was probably well represented by the writ

ings of Dr. Bernhard

Dernb~rg

in the Berliner Tageb1att which

veritably charged :"We [the Germans] have swallowed the devil
whole without cons1dering the m1xture we have drunk."

Dernburg

called the treaty "v1rtually a repet1tion of the Versa111es vio
lenoe, ft 35 and'charaoter1zed America's att1tude of aloofness toward the terr1tor1al adjustment of Europe as a oontradiotion of
her demand for equal privileges 1n mandate territory which was
dictated solely by Amer10an 011 1nterests. ~6
The f1nal l1nk 1n the cha1n of off101al Amer10an
friendsh1p for the German nat10n was forged 1n m1d-l922, when
ambassadors from both powers were respectively exohanged.
34

Dr.

Ibid.
35 Ibid.; "Peaoe with Amer1ca," The Living Age, 8th
Series, XXIV, October 15, 1921, 147-149.
36

Ibid.
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otto L. Wiedfeldt arrived in the United States on May 13, 1922.
He was preceded in Germany by the Amerioan

envoy,~Alanson

B.

Houghton, a wealthy glass manufacturer who had gained part of
"0

his education there and had served in Congress from the State of
New York.

Houghton sailed in early April, having in mind, as he

said, the former years of "peace and friendship which bound the
American and German peoples, rather than the few years of war'
and misunderstanding which [had recently] separated them."~7 Although he was denounced by certain American Legion posts for his
light interpretation of "misunderstanding," he nevertheless reaffirmed his peaceful intentions, remarking:
First and foremost, I do not believe in the
moral or spiritual or even economic value of
~ate.
Hate serves no useful purpose. It is
far more dangerous to those who hate than tothose who are hated. It leads only to confusion and destruotion. The war is ended.
The loser, to his ability, must foot the bill.
But its causes, the apportionment of blame or
guilt, are matters Whioh, frankly, I for one
will no longer discuss.38
His attitude was praised by the New York Evening

~,

whioh called him "right in refusing to enter upon his mission
with a hymn of hate upon his liPs.,,39

This news-sheet refraine

37 IITies with Germany Renewed," Literarx plgest,
LXXIII, April 15, 1922, 14.
38

1l?!9:..

39

Ibid.
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from emotionalism,. however, by adding:,
(Yet,] if there are any Germans 1n this~coun
try • • • who hope that this means a repudiation of the principles for which we sent a
million men to fight. ' •• , they will sooh be
disillusioned. Any/such attitude is as hostile to friendly relations between the United
States and Germany as is [that] of those who
criticise Mr. Houghton for being too conciliatory. There can be no upsetting of the results of the war. Nor will either country
lose anything by realizing that their renewed
association will benefit not only themselves,
but also the entire family of nations.

•

40

Finally, both the Philadelphia Public Ledger and the New York
World, referring to Mr. Houghton's appointment, set the stage
for real German-Amerioan co-operation when they voiced, respect
1vely:
It is about time that the world cleared its
mind of the remnants of some of the more
reckless war propaganda, and remembered that'
there are women and Children in Germany and
a new generation, and that something must be
left of that vast liberal element that would
have set up a real democratic government in
Germany within a few years if it hadn't been
deliberately overwhelmed and martyred in the
war.
and
Peace with Germany has been restored; the time
is past for fanning old passions as the best
proof of' patriotism. It is no disloyalty at
this day to practise common sense and observe
the ordinary rules of courtesY.41
Formal peace, then, was finally effected between the
40

Ibid.

41

Ibid.

87
United states and. Germany in 1921.

YetI the three years which

intervened s1noe the armistioe had not been

enti~ely

neglected

as far as relations between the two peoples were concerned.
This was espeoially true in the field of international commerce,
the flow of which was resumed less than a year after the imperial surrender.

Since such was the case, it might be well to

consider this early trade before gOing on to that which
oped after the Treaty of Berlin.

deve1~

.

Correspondenoe regarding the renewal of commercial relations with the Reich originated towards the end of June, 1919
between the Department of State and members of the Commission t
Negotiate the Peaoe, but serious disoussion of the question did
not'begin until after conolusion of the Treaty of Versail1es. 42
By this time, there was already oonsiderable oonoern over the
added advantages whioh foreign nations, inoluding the top Allie ,
might obtain if Amerioan oommeroe with the Reioh were not quick
ly renewed, but at the same time it was not known for certain
\

whether suoh ties could be set up before ratification of the
treaty by the Senate.

This latter doubt was caused by a stipu-

lation in the paris agreement itself which required ratificatio
by Germany, by three chlef allied powers, and by the oountry

42

~oreign

Relations, 1919, II, 234.

sa
wishing to trade with the new republio before suoh commeroial
bonds oould be re~umed.43

..

In the main, the Peaoe Oommissioners were muoh less
perturbed by the situation than was the State Department.

This

.,~-

was natural beoause the latter, pressed for "definite information as to when and by what means trade relations with Germany
[could] be established,"44 feared that postponement would givf1
the impression that it was the administration's object thereby
to influenoe the Senate's aotion on ratifioation.

It must have

come as a great relief to those in the Department,

~herefore,

t

learn that on June 26 the Counoil of Allied and Associated Powera agreed to raise the blookade around Germany as soon as the

Rei~h alone bad indors~d the treaty.45
This last-mentioned oondition was fulfilled On July 1
1919 when the Versailles Paot was finally ratified by the Germ

home government.

Aooordingly, on July 12 trade relations with

that country were offioially sanotioned by the War Trade Board
\

of the Department of State, and all patents, oommeroial marks,
and oopyrights were made valid.

Persons in the United States

43 "Tra.ding with Germany Again," Current History,
Rew York, The New York Times Publishing 00., X, Pt. 2, 4~2.
44 Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 234. Tnis situation
also prevailed in the bepartment of Commeroe. Reports 01' the
pepartment o~ Commerce: 1919, Washington, D.C., U:S. Government
~rinting Office, l~ 2~
45

"Trading with Germany Again,lI Current History, 432

r
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were allowed now to trade. and communicate with persons resid-

Ii

i
!
'I

ing in Germany, subject, however, to limitations on dyes, dyestuffs, potash, drugs, and chemicals produced in the Reich.

:1

In
,.

this last regard, the Secretary of State informed the Peace Com
.'

-

"

mission that America was not
restricting Germany's general freedom to trade
in dyes, [etc.], but merely controlling their
import into the United States for purely domestic reasons.4S
The immediate effects of this commercial resumption
for American and German merchants was a rush to negotiate whatever business transactions they could possibly make.

To cite

just a few instances of what occurred, it might be said that
less than a week after the blockade withdrawal the Deutsche
~,

the largest private such institution in Germany, was al-

ready negotiating with several New York banks for re-establishment of German credits concerning interests in the United State
Again, by July 18 the United States Shipping Board had already
allocated ten cargo vessels for trade with Germany.48 Likew~se,
trade relations with American concerns at Coblenz was soon "pro
gressing rapidly," and it was reported that several important
Itdeals ll were being consummated. 49 Finally, the American Review
46
47

48

49

Foreign Relatione, 1919, II, 239.
II Trading with Germany Again," Current History, 43:".
Ibid.
Ibid.
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-

of Reviews published a note in Deoember, 1919, to the effeot

.

.

that:

An organization for the enoouragement of trade
with the United State~, too, is in rapid progress of formation._ One important seotion of
it will deal with ootton, in conneotion with
which the German papers of September [1919] report an elaborate scheme :f"or the setting up of
a new Cotton Trade Bank. 50
In oontrast to some of the other European powers,

~ow

ever, American interests found themselves at several distinct
disadvantages when it oame to the aotual proourement of busines
in Germany.

In the first plaoe, the American government contin

ued to restriot the issuanoe of passports for oommeroial representatives to enter that oountry, and thus the only avenue open
to them was through neutral nations.

This defeot was remedied

after July 22, but before that it proved to be an annoying and
often harmful bar to trade.
Seoondly, the United States oompletely laoked a suf'fi
cient number of oonsuls in German oities to allow the olearance
\

Of vessels headed home with oargoes.

Beoause of this deficien-

cy, Herbert Hoover at one time took it upon himself to olear tw
ships at Hamburg, although he had no authority whatsoever to do
so.

The Commission to Negotiate the Peace, instead of urging

50 IIpublic Opinion in Germany," The American Review
of Reviews, New York, Review of Reviews 00., December, l~-~

6~5.

I __________________________________________------------__,
L

l~--------------------------~
91

!

rectification of ,this'trouble, was rather of the opinion that:
a few weeks' postponement of opening trade
relations, even if other countries thereby
obtain a slight • • • advantage, can hardly have permanent c,onsequences. 51

~
~

Yet, the State Department believed that
if the Allies can send consular or commercial
representatives into Germany, even if only for
a few weeks, the advantages gained would be
great· 5 2
On July 18, 1919, therefore, this same source announc
that it was "considering" sending consuls to German Cities, although such appointment,s were not consummated until the following November 4.

John Q. Wood, Emil Saur, and Francis R. stew-

art were then dispatched to Coblenz, not, indeed, to perform or
dinary consular functions, but simply to be in charge of necessary protection for American trade interests, and to supply information to the State Department and to businessmen in gener53
a1 •
This last-mentioned service was greatly improved two
years later when the Bureau of Foreign and Domestio Commerce,
a branch of the United States Commerce Department, opened an of
fice in Berlin proper.

w.

Here, under the able guidance of Howard

Adams and later Charles E. Herring, tremendous amounts of ai
51

Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 234.

52

~.,

53

Ibid., 243-244.
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~

were given to American merohants and their foreign agents to

I

I

promote business and to looate purohase souroes
kets.

~d

sales mar-

Investigati,ons, for instanoe, were made into the German

II

optioal industry, into new German metallurgioal prooesses, in-

I

to the shipping situation, and into various other fields like

I

that of sugar, automobiles, and vegetable fiber industries in

I
i

the Reioh.

Monthly surveys were also prepared on subjeots like

those of "Ourrenoy, Depreoiation and Prioe Inoreases, II liThe Internal Value of the Mark," and others oompleted in 1922.

Final

ly, the offioe at Berlin, whioh oontinued at least through 1925
to 'establish oonneotions for exporters and to produce surveys
of market possibilities and methods, was joined by a branch
headquarters at Hamburg, so that even more advantageous trado
could be oarried on with the Germans. 54
In turning now to a consideration of the actual resul s
of German-Amerioan business in the post-war deoade, it might be
well to pay attention at first to the period from 1919 to 1923.
'l'hese years represented an era of gradually mounting inflation
in the Reioh, and therefore constituted a period of crisis, as
it were, not only for German commerce with the United States,
but also with the entire world.

Whether or not these condition

54 Ninth to Thirteenth Annual Reports of the Secretp.ry of Commerce: 192r--l~-;nr,-\Vashington, D.O., Us Government
Printing Office, 1921-1925, 54, 115, 122, 86-87, 90-91, respectively •
.......
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were at all expeQted cannot be fully determined, but there is
evidence to show that in 1919 merchants in gener.al tended to

.

be rather cautious in their attitude.

In this country the real-'

ization was rather widespread, first of all, that a new basis
for trade with Germany -- both in finance and in good will -had first to be built up, and that, secondly, a lack of suff1cient shipping would still exist for a long while.

•

Thus, as

President Alfred E. Marling of the New York Chamber of Commerce
rather facet10usly put it:
[W]omen are specially strong in [anti-German]
prejudice, and if women will not buy goods,
what's the use of the merchants buy ing?55
The New York Tribune, too, painted a somewhat gloomy
post-war commercial pioture by predicting a period of at least
five years before German trading power could equal the five-hun
dred million dollar mark which had been set as an all-time, high
in 1913.

In fact, this newspaper went so far as to say that

only about twenty per oent of this figure could be reached be\

tore 1925. 56
Nor was there any great optimism over American business among merchants and manufaoturers in Germany.

In fact,

55 "Resuming Trade with Germany," 'Li terary, Digest,
LXII, July 26, 1919, 12. Quotes the New York Journal of ~
merce.
56

Ib1d., 13.

these men looked more .to an exohange of goods over their east\

ern land borders than to trans-ooeanio trade,57 for
they fully
,.
realized the impoverishment of their war-torn oountry. No merohant fleet, no oolonies,

no~

.

indeed any settled exohange .faoil-

ities were available to the Reich, and therefore, it was thought
that little could be expeoted in the way of trade with the United States.'
Surprisingly enough, the estimates of both these parties proved quite inoorrect, for within a year after the blockade had been removed Americans and Germans were again doing bus
ness on an unexpeotedly high soale.

Record-breaking exports

were made to Germany of Amerioan pork, beef, and other meat and
dairy produots, primarily beoause of the nu.trit1onal oondition
within the Reioh.

Inadd1tion; cotton and leaf-tobaooo made up

the bulk of suoh German imports for that year, while large purohases of ohemioals, fertilizers, furs, sugar-beet seed, and
chinaware oaused Amerioan figures to rise from a monthly rate

0

approximately two hundred ninety thousand dollars in July to
over three million two hundred thousand dollars in November.
The totals for the completed fiscal year showed that Germany ha
had almost a ninety-three million dollar import trade with the
57 Herbert T. Wade, ed., The New International Year
Book: 1919, New York, Dodd, Meade an~o~1920, 288-29~. ----

..
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United States" while sales to Americans reached slightly Over
ten and one-half million dollars. 58

,'"

It would seem" then, that German foreign trade with
America was considered by people in trre fatherland to be worthy
of an all-out effort at re-establishment.

This is especially

apparent when the difference between post- and pre-war values
are given consideration" for even though the new totals may see
insignificant in comparison with pre-war trade, the gain shown
above is truly remarkable a feat, having been performed in the
face of national exhaustion" urgent need for food, and a rapidly depreciating currency.
The remaining two years of German inflation were char
acterized by even more spectacular development in commercial
relations between the two countries.

For instance" a' figure

nearing four hundred million dollars expressed the total sales
and purchases made by these peoples in 1920 and 1921. 09

When

placed along side that of 1913,,60 a banner year for German-Amer
lcan trade" it

repres~nts

a veritable comeback to almost threc-

fourths of the pre-war zenith.

It is to be noted, of course,

that these later statistics represent a much lower quantity of
Ibid.
59 itA Great and Growing American Tl'ade with Germany, I
Curren~ QElnion, New York, Current Literature Publishing Co.,
LXX, March, 1921" 402-403.
58

60

$533,000,,000.
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goods than in the last pre-war year because prices on most
materials and finished products had risen to
ing the intervening time.

hi~her

levels dur-

Finally, it might be added that, of

all the Reichls former enemies, the United States was the only
nation to reach so closely its 1913 commercial peak at this
early date.

Such a result was no doubt due to the higher pur-

chasing power of the American dollar as compared to the less.
stable currencies of other countries. 61
During 1922 and 1923, the boom of the two previous
years was slightly deflated, apparently because the Germans wer
unable to deliver goods according to the terms of their contracts.

These years witnessed a rapid fall in the value of the

mark in that country, and there followed as a
rising scale of wage payments.

conseq~ence

a

Nevertheless, the total of Ger-

man imports from the United States for the earlier year mounted to almost forty-six million metric tons, while the Reich exported slightly half that amount to American ports.

In 1923,

after buying was stimulated by the introduction of the Rentenmark, German merohants were able to send an amount of products
worth thirty-eight per cent over that of the previous year, or
a sum of $161,347,000.
61

Of all the nations then supplying Ger-

Wade, New InternEttional Year Book: 1921, 278.

-

--

many, the United States ranked first; as a oustomer it
seventh Plaoe. 62

OOCUl-

...

Toward the end of 1923 'a new era began for GermanAmerioan trade, primarily beQause of the stabilization of the
mark within the Reioh.

This establishment of a sounder finan-

cial foundation oreated a renewed oonfidenoe among merohants of
both nations, the ultimate result of whioh was the negotiation
of a definitive commeroial treaty be'tween America and Getmany
in December of that year.
first

The roots of this agreement lay,

of all, in the adoption by the United States a year ear-

lier of a tariff policy of equal treatment,63 and secondly, in
the German obligation under the Treaty of Versailles to accord
most-favored-nation treatment to the Allied and Associated Powers for a period of five years. 64 The time was ripe, therefore,
to consider just such a paot as this.
Officially known as a Treaty Regarding Friendship,
Commeroe and Consular Rignts,65 the understanding reaohed on De
cember 8, 1923 represented a "careful revision of American instruments in the light of modern conditions and recent experience." 66 Above all, it settled all the tldiplomatio skirmishes

549.

62
63
64

Ibid., 1923, 285; 1924, 292.
McClure, 691.
Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference, XIII,

65
66

Ibid., 1923, II, 29-46.
McClure, 698-699.

Full text provided.
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whioh vexed-the relations between (Germany and the United
States] for half a oentury,,,67 and formed an entirely
new basis
,for the eoonomio relations between those nations.

.

Besides.the

routine regulations pertaining to the personal status of German
and Amerioan residents and oonsuls in the oountry of the other,
the paot partioularly oonoerned itself with provisions for navi
gation and the exohange of goods between the two powers.

As'

one souroe put it:
The parties grant[ed] to eaoh other by Artiole
VII the most-favor ed-nat ion treatment in regard
to duties and taxes on the importation of all
goods grown, produced, or manufaotured in the
territory of the other, no matter whether such
most-favored-nation treatment [was] granted to
[a] third country on condition of reciprocity
or otherwise.68
Moreover, a special stipulation was included in the treaty whic
prohibited the colleotion of a surtax on the flag, that is, it
forbade any type of disoriminatory treatment of commodities imported in foreign vessels as oompared to the same if introduced
in ships of the country of destination.
The Senate, when it was given the opportunity to pass
judgment on this agreement, vigorously objeoted to the last-men
tioned prOVision, for it claimed that the right of the United
67

Ibid.

68 E. Posse, "Germany and the United States in the
Light of their Commercial Policies," German Commerce Yearbook:
1928, Berlin, struppe and Winckler, Imrs;-r9-26.
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states government to grant preferential tariffs and duties on
goods which were imported under the American
interfered with.

.

fl~

was thereby

These objections were based, upon

s~ecial

meas

ures embodied in' the Merchant_Marine Act of 1920,69 and were
directed towards such. coromi tmen1is which appeared to weaken Amer
ican efforts to establish a large merchant marine fleet.
Senate, nevertheless, gave its approval to the treaty,

The

adding~

however, a clause whioh limited to twelve months the period in
which privileges might be shown to German navigation.

If not

then terminated on ninety days previous notice, suoh rights wer
to remain in force only two months after the enactment of Ameri~ legislation oancelling them. 70
Some oriticism of the Senate's aotion appeared in vax
ious newspapers and periodicals throughout the nation, but ther
was no serious controversy over the matter.

The editor of the

Philadelphia InqUirer, for example, thought that such congressional "taoking on" was "taking away from the President the dis\

cretion he had hitherto exercised.,,7l Again, the Philadelphia
Public Ledger claimed that
This reservation, in effect, gives to Oon-'
69

Wesley L. Jones, "Merchant Marine Act of 1920,"
.£!. the Academy- .2£ Polt tical SCience, The Acadelny of
Political Gcience, Columbia University Press, rX, February,1931
233-242.
70 Posse, 19-26.
71 "A Treaty with a String to It," Literary Digesi,
LXXXIV, February 28, ~925, 14 •
Proceedi~A.

I
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gress a,yearhenoe the power to levy disoriminating tariffs whioh will favor Amerioan shipping. It naturally gives Ger~~y
the right to favor German shipping in a
similar manner • • • [If this is done among
all nations] it may • '•• signalize an international tariff.war of oonsiderable proportions in whioh the United States mayor
may not oome out [on] the preferable end of
the horn.72
The treaty itself, however, was oonsidered by the Providenoe
Journal to be "another important step toward the restoration of
pre-war relations with the German government. n73
In the final analysis, of oourse, opinion meant very
li ttle, for the paot -had already been signed and, though delaye "
went into effeot on Ootober 14, 1925.

Its signifioanoe lay in

the Amerioan aooeptanoe of an unconditional interpretation of
its

most-favored-nati~n

policy, a development whioh' ha;rmonized

with that nation's Open Door attitude and whioh oonstituted one
more step toward the establishment of equality in the world's
trade oonditions. 74 Finally, it remained as a bas1s for friend
ly interoourse between Amer10a and the Reioh throughout the per
iod of the Republic, for the Senate's power of disorimination
was never used against 1nooming German ships.
From 1923, then, until well after 1930 German-America
72

-Ibid.

73 ..ill.9:,.
74

McClure, 701.
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oommeroial relations were guided by the provisions agreed upon
in the treaty made at the olose of the inflation
Reioh.

~eriod

in the

.

As indioated in the diagr'am below,75 trade between the

two nations grew to a oonsiderable degree in the. seven years

YEAR

GERMAN IMPORTS FROM
THE UliITED STATES

GERMAN EXPORTS TO
THE UNITED STATES

1924

$ 579,676,386

$ 139,258,435

1925

634,595,756

164,251,523

1926

420,000,000* .

158,000,000*

1927

492,645,000

184,425,000

1928

483,554,000

189,908,000

1929

410,258,652 .

254,673,542

1930

.300,000,000·

thereafter, always remaining, however, in favor of the United
States.

Nevertheless, it oan be readily seen that a gradual
75

Oomp11ed from statistios given 1n the New Interna

tiona~ ~ Book: 1925-1931, 281-282, 312-313, 295-296; 333-~34,
656-~57; and Commerce Yearbook: 1926-1930, Washington,D.C., U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1927-1931, II, 263, 279, 288-289,
399, 247. (*) indioates an approximation only.

,i

.,
'I:i,,!,
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levelling-off prooess manifested itself in the same short
span, so that in'general, a distinot rise in German exports to
Amerioan buyers paralleled a similar deorease

i~

purohases made

.,~-

in this country..

The ohief factor in this development, of

oourse, was. Germany's determined effort to acquire a "favorable
balanoe of trade," that is, a margin of exports over imports,
in order to oontinue reparation payments.

Only in 1929 and

1930 did the Reioh suooeed in aocomplishing this goal in her
all-over oommeroial transaotions,76 although this was not apparent in her trade with Amerioa.
Finally, it might be stated that throughout the years
from 1923 to 1930 American oommeroe with Germany oontinued to
remain greater than any other nation's business with that same
power, yet as a buyer this oountry usually ranked third.

This

may have been due in part to the e,normous tariff rates required
by the United States, many of whioh were set at twioe the level
of those found in Germany.

.

The Amerioan government, however,

\

consistently followed this same po1ioy throughout the 1920's,
always refusing .to oonsider any agreements regarding such dut1es. 77
In summary, then, muoh evidenoe seems to exist to
76 "German Foreign Trade for 1930," Ourrent H1storl,
XXXIII, Maroh, 1931, 941-942.
77

Posse, 19-26.
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show that both the- d1plomat10 and the oommero1al relat10ns 1nvolv1ng the Un1ted states and the new German Repub110 progressed steadily throughout the

1~ed1ate

post-war deoade.

They seemed, indeed, to paralLel the growing spirit of friendliness desoribed in an earl1er part of th1s thesis.

Yet, in

order to make a final judgment 1n this matter the task still
remains to br1efly soan at least one other facet of the
under investigation.

subjeo~

The next ohapter, therefore, shall deal

with the very important topic of German-Amerioan relations
along the lines of finanoe and reparations.

i

,I
II

!I,

OHAPTER IV

li'l

GEllMAN-AMERIOAN FINANOES AT HOME AND ABROAD

"'ii:1

German-Amerioan finanoial relat10ns in the f1rst deoade after World War I were oonoerned. for the most part, with
the solution of two fundamental problems.

F1rst of all, there

existed the oomp11oated issue of balanc1ng the payment of Amerioan war olaims against the return of German property sequestrated and held in trust by the United states government.

The othel

problem, even more intrioate, involved the partioipation of
American finanoial experts and moneyed interests in aiding the
Reich to fulf111 the reparations obligat1ons heaped upon 1t by
the Treaty of Versailles.

Naturally, either of these matters,

if expla1ned in full detail would require a greater amount of
time and spaoe than are afforded by this investigation, and
therefore only

a brief

resume of tne faots conoerned w111 be

attempted here.
The origin of the alien property tangle lay in Amerioan legislation enaoted for the purpose of national defense in
1917.

For instanoe, on Ootober 6 of that year Oongress passed

the Trading with the Enemy Aot whioh authorized the President
to regulate and freeze monetary, oredit, or trade transactions
104

,1,:'
1
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"
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,

"

105

and to seize and

property belonging. to enemy aliens.

~old

oontrol was designed,

Qn

the one hand, to

prevent~the

This

hostile

use of suoh foreign holdings against the United states, and on

.

the other, to oonserve them for their owners until suoh time as
they oould safely be returned.

Above all, the possessors of

goods so seized were not oonsidered as having been deprived of
their ownership, but rather, as A. Mitohell Palmer, the first·
Alien Property Oustodian, asserted, suoh property was merely
plaoed under
the authority of a oommon-law trustee; there
is no thought of a oonfisoation or dissipation of property thus held in trust. l
Nevertheless, at his own request, Palmer's powers wer
enlarged on Maroh 28, 1918 to inolude "managing" the estates an
such other holdings as were entrusted to him, so that he might
lido any aot or thing in respeot thereof or make any disposition
thereof ••• as if he were the absolute owner."2

The oustodi

then garbed himself in an Amerioan flag, proolaimed his

stat~

as a "fighter on the industrial front,' and aooordingly pledged
the 'oomplete eradioation" of all German influenoes in enterprises under his oontrol, promising "their thorough neutraliza.1 Frank P. Huddle, "Enemy Property," Editorial Researoh Reports, II, July 7, 1945, 10.
2

~---

~.
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,
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tion into an Amerioan,oharaoter. 13

Thereafter, and for the

next three years, or until the teohnioal state

ot

war with Ger-

many was deolared ended, Palmer oontinued to liquidate alien
property with little or no regard for the oonsequences to fol10w. 4
In August, 1921, when America made her separate peace
with the Reich, the following provision was oontained in the·
Treaty of Berlin:
All property of the Imperial Government, or
its suooessor ••• , and of all German nationals, whioh was, on April 6, 1917, in or
has sinoe that date oome into possession or
control of ••• the United States of Ameri"ca shall be retained by [this nation] and no
disposition thereof made, except as shall
have been • • • or shall be provided by law
until suoh time as the Imperial German Government ••• or [its] suooessor, shall have •••
made suitable provision for the satisfaction
of all olaims [made] against [it by injured
American citizens].5
Under the terms of this pact, then, the United states government undertook to' hold as security against the payment of Ameri
can claims great amounts of enemy property.

An estimate of thi

vast treasure might be gained from a list provided by Literary
Digest in whioh the government was credited with having seized
3

~.

4

~.,

10-11

5 Foreign Relations, 1921, II, 30.

10"1

about 31,818 pieoes of enemy property. Of
these trusts there (were] 29,606 valued at
less than $10,000, 1,052 between $10,000 and
$50,000, 498 between $50,000 and $250,000,
162 between $250,000 and $1,000,000. The
total • • • [was] valued at more than $400,
000,000, and the pr.operty embraoed [was]
soattered over oontinental United States and
[its] insular possessions. It oonsisted of
industrial plants, inolusive of ohemioal and
woolen mills, steamship lines, banks, land
and oattle oompanies, salmon faotories, mines
of gold, silver, and other metals, and thousands of paroels of real estate and trusts represented by seourities and liquid assets. 6
With this in mind, then, it should not be surprising
to learn that, shortly atter this treaty was made publio, a lon
and involved oontroversy ensued in the nation's press over the

. !

validity of holding suoh sequestrated German property as a host
age in order to influenoe the fulfillment of obligations by the
German government.?

On the one side there were those individu-

als who advooated a oomplete return of all assets held to the
private persons oonoerned, for aooording to an Amerioan treaty
with Prussia in l8a8:
merohants of one state resident in the other
[were to be] given nine months to oolleot
their debts and to settle their affairs, and
(were to] be allowed to depart freely, oarrying all their effeots with them. S
6 "Doubtful Fate of Alien Property," Literary Digest,.
LXXXIV, July 15, 1922, 14-15.
7 An exoellent oomprehensive view of this problem is
oontained in liThe Alien Property Question," Con§ressional £1gest, Washington, D.C., V, Deoember, 1926, 327- 58.
a liThe German Patents," New Republio, New York, New
Republio Publishing Co., XXVI, July 19, 1922, 202-203.
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In oontradiotion to this guarantee, the

!!! Republio

observed, for instanoe, that numerous German patents were seize
during the war and sold for their, Hfull value or tor a song."
These possessions,. it olaimed; were "private property and more, It
for they served the purpose of oontrol.

As private possessions,

then, this souroe unstint1ngly oalled for their return to their
rightful owners.

It denounoed the idea that German violations•

of the same treaty, whi9h provided for immunity of Amerioan pro
erty at sea, gave the United States government the right also t
violate its obligations.

Moreover, the periodioal oalled atten

tion to the faot that business interests of this oountry would
be greatly harmed if America were to set the precedent of reverting to confisoation in wartime. 9
In a like manner, the Nation acoused the Alien Proper
ty Custodian of not "Amerioanizing" any of the 4,800 German pat
ents mentioned above beoause of war emergencies, but rather to
enable American manufaoturers·to emasculate their foreign
petitors.

co~

Said this magazine:
The action was not a war-measure but bald commercial spoliation sugar-coated with patriotic
phraseologY-10

9

Ibid.

10 "Are We Amerioans Thieves?", The Nation, CXVIl,
August 1, 1923, 104.
---,
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As proof of its

s~atements,

this periodical noted how, in 1923,

eighty-seven Amerioan firms manufaotured annuallx 64,632,187
pounds of dyes, while nine years 'earlier only seven companies
.
had been able to produce 6,619;7a9 pounds. ll Finally, the ~
~

sarcastically asked whether it 'was to the offioe of Alien

Property Confisoator or Alien Property Custodian that Mr. Palme
and his suooessors were apPointed," and asserted that whatever
gains Americans were reaping in lower prioes were based on robbery and thus rooted in dishonor.

It hoped that such ignominy

would not be allowed to further tarnish the good name of the
United States. 13
On the other side, there were advooates, not only of
holding enemy property until Amerioan olaimants reoeived recompense for losses before and during the wu,but also of aotuall),
reimbursing injured oitizens from out of this very German property itself.

The Literary Digest, to oite one example, noted

how seven years had

alre~y

passed and no settlement had been

made for losses inflioted in the Lusitania disaster.

It point-

ed also to tne fact that there had been a oonf1scat10n of Unite
states property in Germany s1milar to that carried on in this
oountry, of whioh Amerioans had 'got nothing back, except a delusive and insulting offer to pay at the present value of the
11

Ibid.

12

-Ibid.
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German mark." 13
Opinions on this same matter oame also from leading
I"

spokesmen in government and

busi~ess.

For instanoe,

f~om

Sen-

ator Osoar W. Underwood of Alabama oame the assertion that German demands for the return of oertain dye and drug patents now
held in the United States were apparently an enter1ng wedge
whose purpose was to deprive the Amer10ans of all the oollateta
reta1ned as seour1ty for payment of olaims against the former
enemy.

The Senator therefore suggested in Oongress that
. Ameri-

oan olaims be satisfied out of the property in the hands of the
Alien Property Oustodian, starting first with the liqu1dat1on
,.

of German government property and then resorting to the sale of
that of individual German nationals. 14 A'. Mitohell PalJDer,
oinc€: removed from his posi t10n as oustodian, agreed with Under

wood, remarking:
The Underwood bill is entirely feasible and an
entirely proper method under the Treaties and
the Trading with the Enemy Aot.15
Probably the most noted authority to take the same
stand was Samuel Flagg Bemis, then professor of history at Whit
man College 1n Wash1ngton state.

Said Bem1s:

13 "Unole Sam to Hand Fritz His Bill,""L1terary.Qigeat, LXXIV, August 12, 1922, 14.

14 Ib1d.
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It is useless to speak of oolleoting.anything
from Germany unless out 'of this sequestrated
property. This oan easily and honorably be
done • •••1 6 .
,.
He

furthe~

.

noted that it was

",."

"n~~dle~s

to add that [if the pro

erty was actually returned], lt (would] be

t~en

over by the

Allies to satisfy the unextinguished olaims of their subjeots •.J.'7
Bemis's main argument hinged on the differenoe betwee
the meaning of oonfiscation and that of sequestration, the

l~t

ter of whioh he defined as "a milder procedure whioh reoognizes
the title of ••• property to be held in trust for the owner.'
The American government, he olaimed, had only used the second
mean s, and then; only against merohant s living in Germany.

In

this last conneotion, he quoted James W. Garner, 'an authority
on international law, as being of the opinion that:
It does not • • • appear that the property
of any German: subjeot residing in the United
States ••• was seized or sOld. le ,
He olaimed, therefore, that no violations of the le28 paot ooul
be oharged.
In general, then, Bemis favored the use of enemy prop
erty as payment for Amerioan war olaims.

Yet, to aavoid an ac-

16 Samuel F. Bemis, "Shall We Forget the Lusitania?lI,
The Outlook, aXXXI, August 30, 1922, 710-713.
17 Ibid.

-

18 Ibid. From James W. Garner, "Treatment of Enemy
Aliens," American-Journal of International Law, XII, Ootober,
1918, 765-766.
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cusation by Germany of -Aveiled oonfisoat1on",' he reoommended
the sett1ng up of a jOint olaims o'ommiss10n, but lf1th the under
standing that all olaims awarded-to Amer1can olaimants would be
paid out of German property then-1n sequestration,
with the
,
balance returned to the Reioh.
\

Bemis, it seems, had a keen
oontroversy over alien

prop~rty,

i~sight

into the whole

for his suggestions were, in'

part, being oarr1ed out at almost·the same time as they were of
fered.

On August 10, 1922, the German and

Am~rioan

governments

established a Joint Mixed Ola1ms Oommission whioh was to adjudi
oate debt olaims of Amerioan oit1zens

agai~st

the German state,

to process olaims for property of suoh persons 'arising sinoe
July 31, 1914, in respeot to damage to, or .seizure of, their
property, rights, or 1nterests,' and to handle other demands fo
"loss or damage to whioh the United States or 1ts nat10nals
[bad] been subjeo~ed."19

The funotions of this oommission, the,

were identioal with those assigned in the Versailles Treaty

to

the Reparat10n Commission, the Olearing Offioes, the Mixed Arbi
ral Tribunal, and other groups for investigating olaims. 20
19 Huddle, "Enemy Property," 11; Forei~Relations,
Paris Peaoe Conferenoe, XIII, 627-630; 1922, II, ~ -265.
627-630.

20

Foreign Relations, Paris Peaoe Conferenoe, XIII,

i
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For some time afterwards the German possessions in
question were still withheld from their owners, Seoretary of
state Hughes being of the mind ,of
As a

result~

stand~

Underwood~ Bemis~

and others.

muoh criticism was heaped upon his head for this

espeoially in the Amerioan papers.

The Nation, in mid-

1922, referred Hughes to Alexander Hamilton's Nineteenth Camillus

Letter~

and asked him to note its legality, partioularly •

after his preaohing against oonfisoation in Mexioo and Russia. 2
It oommended the House of Representatives for ignoring the Stat
Department head and approving a bill, later known as the Winslo
Act, whDch authorlzed the return of some twenty-eight thousand
alien property trusts of less than ten thousand dollars

eaoh~

and to pay an equal sum on all holdings of larger value. 22 Yet,
even thls was attaoked by the
that such

returns~

~Republio

which pOinted out

while ellminatlng ninety per cent of the

trusts then held, stl11 retained nlnety per oent of the property.

It oontalned an appeal for a total restoration, saying: \
Every oonsideratlon, ••• morallty, national tradltion, treaty, lnternatlonal law~ express promise, and self-interest, urge upon
Congress the duty to • • • return all of the

21 "National Honor: Hughes vs Hamilton,· The Nation,
CIVII, August 8, 1923~ 131.
22

Huddle, "Enemy Property," 13.
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sequestrated propertY-23
•

The alien property tangle continued in.- this fashion
for the entire first post-war decade.

i

Late in 1923, however,

the Germans began to submi t payments both on awards made by the
Mixed Claims Commission and on their war obligations to the
United States government, the latter
lion dollars.

reaohin~

about twenty mil-

Returns of property approximating half of

tha~

sum were made to citizens in the Reich that same year, wh1le 1n
1924 and 1925 these payments rose to thirteen and fourteen million dollars, respectively.24

By 1932, a total of sixty-one

million dollars had been paid in this fashion.

The Winslow Act

further required the return of all patents, copyrights, and
trade marks vested by the Alien Property Custodian and still in
his possession.

The number of non-remitted patents left in 192

was 5,18S, all of which were back in German hands before the
end of 1928.
Throughout the Coolidge Administration, however, pro\

~

posals for returning all property to the nation's former foes
\

were oonstantly and oonsistently opposed by the Amerioan Claimants Association.

Consequently, a compromise was reached 1n

23 "The Sequestrated A11en Property, II
XXVI, Augt\st 2, 1922, 269-270.
24

Huddle, "Enemy Property,U 13_

~

Republic,
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Maroh,1928, when the·Oongress authorlzed the Battlement of War
Clalms Aot.

By thls agreement, Amerloans stl11 ..unlndemnified

were awarded one hundred thousand dollars on eaoh of their
olaims plus eighty per oentof the remainder.

German claimants,

on the other hand, were allowed eighty per oent of all their
valid olaims, the other twenty per oent going to pay Amerioan
requests. 25

•

Thus, a total of forty-three to eighty-six million
dollars were remitted to German olaimants in 1929 and 1930, respeotively, wlth a grand aggregate of $175,953,813. having been
p~d

by 1932.

At the same time, property valued at approximate

ly $613,387,500 was dlsposed of, so that by mid-1935 the outstanding claims of German nationals amounted to less than sixty
two milllon dollars, and unpaid Amerioan awards totalled someI

thing near fifty-eight million dollars.

An agreement providing

for the diSCharge of Germany's war indebtedness to the United
states was signed on June 23, 1930, but sinoe no payments were
made after September, 1931, it seems unneoessary to explain
this latter paot. 26
The final topio whioh' shall be oonsidered in this the
25 Ibid. These funds were to be replaoed by either
a Congressional appropriation, or by future payments made by
the German government.
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"
relationship to the greatest enigma of

.

,

the 1920's -- the settlement of the German reparations problem

..

growing out of World War I.

* should
Aotually, this entire issue
,

have been oonfined to the European oontinent,a? for Amerioans
asked no part in the war indemnity nor did the nation partioi.
pate in the Reparation Oommission, but due to the position of
the United States as a major power and the world's top oredit.
or,2S this oountry soon found itself almost as deeply involved
in the reparations dispute as did Germany herself.
Probably the first real oontaot in this matter between
,~

the Amerioan nation and that of the Germans ooourred in early
1921 when Dr. Walter Simons, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, made mention of an international loan to Ellis Dresel,
the Amerioan oommissioner in the Reioh.2a The loan, argued Simons, was neoessary to bolster German oredit, whioh undermined
by the general mortgage olause of the Treaty of Versailles, was
in need of resusoitation in order to pay the one hundred thirtytwo billion marks 30 asked by the Allies in reparations. Spe~27 President Hoover stressed this point in his press
statement of June 20, 1931, in whioh he announced American proposals for a world-wide moratorium. William Starr Myers, ed.,
~ state Papers ~ other Publio Writings of Herbert Hoover,
Garden City, New York, Doubleday, Doran and~o., 1934,-r;-593.
28 Brooks, 129, sets Amerioa's outstanding credits i
1919 at $12,000,000,000.
29 Charles P. Howland, American Forel~ Relations:
1928, New Haven, Yale University Press, 192s:,--3
344.
~o
$31,500,000,000.
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for the American government, Seoretary of State.Hughes declined
to act on the German suggestion, adding
. that this country held
Germany guilty for the war and believed'in total,reparation for

.

damages done.

Hughes advised':, instead, a renewed attempt by t1:e

Germans to deal directly with the Allies for settlement of thei
difficulties. 31
Later in 1921, the German government again

appeale~

t

the United States, this time in the person of President Harding,32 to mediate the reparation question and to !~X the sum to
be paid by the Germans to the Allies.
mised.

Full oo-operation was pr

The State Department refused this seoond request, sayin
This government could not agree to mediate the
question of reparations with a view to acting
as umpire in its settlement • • • • [But if]
the German government will promptly formulate
such proposals as would present a proper basis
for discussion ••• (the United States] will
consider bringing the matter to the attention
of the Allied Governments. • • .33
,

. After this episode, ,.li tt1e was heard of the reparatio
quarrel in American ciroles until August, 1922.

A new appeal

was then sent to Washington from the,Reioh, this time in quest
of United States interoession with the Reparation Commission to
accept German pledges of payment. 34 Still quite aloof, the

,

:,

'III

I,i!

',I

:ji

31
32
33

Foreign Relations, 1921, II, 37-40, 49.
Ibid., 40.
Ibid., 44.

34

~.,

1923, II, 160.

I II ~
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I,~--------------~
118

, I

I

State Department expressed its adamant unwillingness to aocept
this responsibility.

The oond1t1on'of German finances,
in the
...

-

'

meantime, continued to grow so grave that even such a prominent

.

American as Thomas W. Lamont -of J.P. Morgan and Company refused
to take any initiative in the matter of strengthening them.
Strangely enough" Lamont seemed to look for aotion from the
government on the"whole issue of reparations. 35
He was not far from wrong,for in October authorities
in the nation's oapitaladvised the setting up of a businessman's oommittee to solve the problem, but Frenoh opposition
oaused the shelving of the entire matter until the year's end.
Only on Deoember 29, 1922 did the first really significant action come from this oountry when Secretary Hughes addressed the
Amerioan HistorioalAssooiat1on in New Haven partly as follows:
What is our attitude toward the question of
reparations ••• ? •• Some of our people
have suggested that the United States should
assume the role of arbiter ••• [but since]
we have not been asked ••• it would be an
extraordinary and unpreoedented thing for us
to ask for suoh an invitation.
I do not think that we should endeavor to
take on such a burden of responsibility. We
have quite enough to bear without drawing to
ourselves all the ill feeling which would result from disapPOinted hopes and a settlement
which was viewed as forced upon nations by
this country which at the same time is demanding the payment of its debts.
If • • • statemen cannot agree • • • what can
35

~.,

165.
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be done'
Why should not they (statesmen) lnvlte men of
the hlghest authority ln finanoe in t~eir respeotive oountries -- men of suoh prestige, experienoe and honor that their agreement upon
the amount to be paid, and upon a financialplan for working out the payments, would be accepted throughout the world as the most authori tative expression obtainable? • .' • I have no
doubt that distinguished Americans would be
willing to serve on suoh a commission.36

f

~.

Sani ty, however, was thrown to the winds, and wi tb it
the American suggestions, when the Frenoh seized the Ruhr valley on January 11, 1923.

Reparatlons from the Reioh were meant

to be foroefully exaoted and thus the plan of the previous year
somewhat faded into obsouri ty.

Amerioan opinion leaned, on

the one hand, from delight in the Frenoh aotion to condemnation,
on the other, of the Ruhr polloy as rendering impossible the re
ouperation of Germany's finanoes and the impairment of all
Europe's eoonomio rehabilltatlon. 37 , Aotion by the Harding Administration was demanded in a few oases, but no suoh offioial
move was ever made.

Indeed, as was mentioned earlier, American

troops were even removed from the Rhineland at this oritical
time.
In May, 1923, the idea of an experts' committee was
again revived, this time by the.German government itself. 38
36 Charles G. Dawes, A Journal of Reparations, London, Macmillan and Co., 1939, 24Y-~44.
-37 Foreign Relations, 1923, 52-53.
38

~.,

57.
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Hughes temporarily favored a oonferenoe solely between the
French and the Germans, but later 39 agreed to Amerioan
partioi,.
pation in a general series of talks if suoh ooul~ be arranged
unoffioially.

On Deoember 7_the plan was finally agreed upon

and the Reparation Oommission deoided to appoint two oommittees
to investi'gate the whole

reparatio~s,

a balanoe of the German budget

~d

issue, the first to seek I

a stabilization of the Reioh's

and the seoond to estimate the flow of oapital from
Germany in order to, foroe its return. 40

ourrenoy~

On the very day that the Reparations Oommission forme
\

the above

oommittees~

the Germans offioially requested Amerioan

representation on that group to whioh was entrusted the Reich's
budget and ourrenoy problem. 4l Acoordingly, through the able
intervention of James A. Logan, sole Amerioan observer on the
commission, oonsent of the United states was secured,42,and invitations were sent during the following month to the Amerioan
delegates.

Among these were General Oharles G. Dawes, a well\

known Chicago finanoier and later V1oe-fres1dent of the United
states, and Mr. Owen D. Young, an exper1enoed lawyer and busi39 Mid-Ootober.
40 Foreign Relations, 1923, II, 104. Only the work
of the first oommittee will be oonsidered here.
41 Ibid.
42 Carl Bergmann, The Histor~ of Reparations, Boston,
New York, Houghton Mifflin Co:;-1~7, 2 1:-
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nessman, both of, wham were asked to join the first oomm1ttee. 43
These exper1enoed finano1ers, together with a

n~ber

of others

from England, Franoe, Italy, and Belgium, a group popularly
known as the Dawes Committee> worked assiduously for three
months beginning in mid-January, 1924 in order to prepare the
plan whioh they laid before the Reparation Commission on April
9. 44
•
The Dawes Plan, as this reoommendation oame to be
oalled, was

readil~

aooepted by that body, by the Allies at the

London Oonferenoe of July-August,- 1924, and ultimately by the
German government itself. Briefly, it was merely a provisiona1 45 solution to the reparation nightmare, for it emphasized th
faot that no definite sum was or oould, at that time, be settle
for total payments.

Nevertheless, the soheme had its merits fo

it Hreplaoed the fantastic annuities of former plans by amounts
wh10h seemed bearable -- at least for a few years,1I46 thus assuring a quiet period between Germany and the Allies for a shor
,

time to oome.

\

Again, it aoknowledged the Weimar government's

need for a period of f1nanoial rest, and thus provided for a
43 Dawes, 246.
44 Gustav Stolper, German Eoonom~: 1870-1940, New
York, Reynal and Hitohcock, 1940, 168-225.ex~ Dawes, 278-5
45 Said Dawes himself:"The only thing definite about
the Dawes Plan is the faot that it is not definite." otto Hoetscl,
Germany's Domestic and Foreign Policies, New Haven, Yale U. Pres,
1929, 69.

46

Stolper, 168-225.
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span whioh inoluded not only a time of quasi-total indulgence,
but also one of merely parti.1 resumption of

pa~ents.

Repara-

tions annuities were therefore •reduced to one billion gold
t
marks for the 1924-1925 fiscal year, and only gradually raised
to two and one-half billion marks in the "normal year" of 19281929.

Above all, an eight hundred million "mark reparation loan,

internationally SUbscribed, was authorized for the revival and
stabilization of German currenoy.47
In the Dawes Plan, then, oame the oulmination of a
long sertes of mixed American gestures and efforts to aid Germany 1n solving the reparations dilemma.

In faot, one publica-

tion of the day went so far as to say:
• • • in many ways the most oonvincing partioipation of tne United States in international problems apart from those admitted as
suoh is associated with the settlement of
the reparation question. Beginning with an
address by Secretary Hughes at New Haven in
1922, and running down through the exchanges
of opinion between London ,and Washington in
the Fall of 1923, to the work of the Dawes
committees themselves, the settlement of the
reparat10ns problem has been a matter in
whioh the United states has been the pr1memover and more influential factor. 48
This same source, however, adds the appropriate comment: "That
this action has been 'unofficial' reveals not so much the natur
47 Americmls part1oipation in this and other German
loans during tne 1920's shall be oonsidered presently.
48 liThe Myth 01' American Isolation," Current History,
XXI, November, 1924, 205-206.
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of the attitude o~ the Washington government. n49

Suoh a oriti-

oism was undoubtedly true, for the Germans were most
. assuredly
able to look to Amerioans as having been olosely assooiJted
with the whole Dawes idea, but not to Amerioa as suoh.

Re gar d,.

ing the reparations almost as "tainted gold," the Washington

.

government was silent, reserved, and non-oommittal throughout
all disoussions on the subjeot of war payments. 50 It merely,
olosed its eyes, so tospeak, in order to allow its oitizens to
aid in reaching a solution.

An insight into .the administra-

tion's mind in this matter might well be gained from a passage
spoken by Secretary of state Hughes who, while in London in
July, 1924, explained:
You may oount on our interest and assistance
in the necessary measures to assure the eoonomio rehabilitation of Europe. It does not
matter that this aid is not given by the Government. Without wishing to say anything oontroversial on this subject, I may give it as my
conviotion that had we attempted to make America's oontribution to the recent plan of adjustment a governmental matter, we should have
been involved in a hopeless debate, and there
would have been no adequate action. We shoul~
have been beset with demands, objeotions, instruotions. This is not the way to make an
Amerioan contribution to eoonomio revival.
You have the Dawes Plan, and you have the
partioipation of Amerioan experts with the liberty ot' constructive effol't, which was essential, beoause it was undertaken in the only
f

49

Ibid.

50 Henry L~' Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Servioe in Peace and War, New York, Harper and Bros7; 1948, 202.
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way in whioh suooess was possible- 51
Similarly, President Ooolidge, in oommending Gemeral Dawes upon

..

his splendid work, remarked:
• _ • had you bee~ representing the government you would have been hampered, and no
doubt your proposed aotion would have be-'
oome the objeot of politioal oontroversy
here. I have said that you and your assooiates have represented not the Government,
but the Amerioan mind. S2
•
Finally, it might be added that both Germany and the
United States gained as well as lost muoh in the extended operation of the Dawes Plan.

Immediately upon the floatation of

the Reparation Loan in Ootober, 1924, an era 'of prosperity, unequalled in the history of the Reioh, oame into existenoe, and
all phases of German eoonomio life hummed with aotivity for the
next five years. 53 Nevertheless, it proved in the end to be an
illusion only, for the Weimar state, living as it was on bor,

-

rowed money, remained in existenoe and paid its reparation dues
o~ly

so long as its finanoial veins were supplied with fresh

loans from abroad.

When, in 1929 and 1930, the flo\Y of oredits

was suddenly halted, the whole. house of oards oollapsed, and
Germany flung open its doors to National Sooialism.
51 Oharles E. Hughes,
Harper and Brothers, 1925, 108.
52 Dawes, 247.

!h! Pathway

~

Peaoe, New York,

53 A comprehensive study ot this phase of German eco1''.,;omy 1s presented in James W. Angell, The Recoverr .2! Germany,
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1929, passim.
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The United.States, too, reaped a similar fate, for
after waging a long'diplomatio battle with the Allies,54
Ameri,.
oa suooeeded in tapping the reparations annuities paid by Ger-

.

many as compensation for oost of the Amerioan ocoupation troops
.
.

in the Rhineland and as payment of oertain war claims still not
remitted by the We1mar regime.

All in ail, suoh mon1es netted

this nation almost ninety-two million dollars from Germany ~
six annual 1nstallments between 1924 and 1930. 55 Yet, like the
Reich, the United States, too, eventually was laid low by the
world depress10n which began in 1929 and whioh is known today
to have been due in large part to the internat10nal finanCial
polioies follow1ng the Great War.
In matters of reparations, then, America was almost a
olosely oonneoted to Germany in the post-war years as she was t
her wartime asso01ates.

This affiliation is even more emphatio

ally revealed when attent10n is drawn to the amount of a1d

~

in aotual dollars and oents -- whioh Americans aocorded to German interests dur1ng the years between 1921 and 1930.

Conse-

quently, it might be well to briefly scan the situation as it
concerned American loans to the Reich at that time, espeoially
54 Forei~n Relations, 1924, II, 1-124; 1925, II,
163; 1926, II, 156-163; 1927, II, 722-724.

1~3

55 Charles R.8. Harris, Germany's Foreign Indebtedness, London, Oxford U. Press, 1935, 93. Cites the ECOnO!llis"f,
Heparations and War Debts Supplement, January 23, 19~2.

II,'
"
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sinoe the latter formed such an integral part of the entire
reparations picture.
Post-war financial relations between the United States

.

and Germany fell into two rather well defined phases, one exte~ding

through the year 1923 and the other beginning tne next

year with the Dawes Reparation Loan.

During both periods, the

stability and trustworthiness of German ourrenoy played the •
leading role in determining the extent of Amerioan lending, although d1strust 1n this oountry of European "politioal scheming" and a homespun sent1ment against foreign entanglements
were likew1se important in this matter. 56
Pr10r to 1924 ,very 11ttle long-term investing was done
by Amer10ans in German interests.

In faot, during 1919 and 192

even Herbert Hoover, in trying to solioite credit outlays from
both the government in Washington and from individual bankers
for purposes of German economio rehab11itation, was largely unsuocessful. 57

The only loans then acoorded to the Reioh were
\

privately plaoed issues whioh were mustered by German sympathiz
ers in the United States and by a limited number of conservativ
souls who were vaguely oonfident of Germany's quiok recovery.
All in all, between five hundred million and a billion dollars
56

Brooks, America

57

~.,

121-130.

~

Germany, 129.
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oame to be invested in the Reiohbefore 1923 when the great inflation oaused most of these Amerioan seourities to beoome entirely worthless. 58
o·

Toward the end of

1923~

of oourse, oame.the "miracle

of the Rentenmark," and once more German ourrenoy beoame stabil
ized.

Within six to eight months foreign credits, mostly from

the United

States~

onoe again began flowing into the fatherland,

so that even before the Reparation Loan was floated in October,
1924, several German firmssuoh as the

Sug~ Indust~y,

the 'Ger-

man Potash and Rhine-Westphalia'Coal Syndioates, the North German Lloyd, the Dye Works, and tne German Petroleum Oompany were
able to raise some funds under short-term contraots. 59
As was mentioned previously, the Dawes

Committee~

in

its proposed solution of the reparations muddle, had advised
f

the funding of an international loan to the Reioh as a means of
improving the

trustwo~thiness

of its finanoes.

Negotiations fo

the oarrying out of this gigantic enterprise were held at the
close of the London Oonference of

1924~

a speoial parley which

had met to consider tne aoceptability of the Dawes Plan.

For

some time a waiting attitude was assumed by a number of America
58 Ibid.~ 140. Harris, in his Forei~ Indebtedness,
3, sets the amount at 11 milliards (billions,' 0 ReIChmn;.trKs.
59 Robert R. Kuozynski~ American Loans to
New York, Tne Macmillan Co., 1927, 4.

Germ~1~,

las
and

Brit~sh

bankers

who~

during the

.

had demanded

oonferenoe~

that the proposed loan be more striotly

guaran~eed
~

against po-

1/1

litioal oomplioations than was provided by the experts' report.

This

situation~

however~

. lasted only until late
,

ber, when disoussions were

resumed~

Septem-

this time between represent

atives of the Allies and those of the Germans.

The former were

represented by agents of John Pierpont Morgan and Company

~d

of the Bank of England, while the German delegates inoluded Dr.
Rjalmar Sohaoht, president of the' Reiohsbank, and the finance
minister, Dr. Hans Luther.
Negotiations for the Reparation Loan, whioh Bergmann
says were "brief and more or less diotated,uSO culminated in th
signing of a final agreement on Ootober 14, 1924.

This paot

provided for the issuanoe of an eight hundred million mark loan,
internationally subsoribed, to the German Republio, for which
annual interest rate of seven per oent was to be paid by the re
oeiving party.

Amerioa, with its surplus of uninvested capital,
\

was induoed, by Qtrict seourity measures in the Dawes Plan, to
aooept a tranohe of one hundred ten million dollars, while smal
er quantities were assumed by the British, the Frenoh, and
others.

Four days

~ater,

the Amerioan securities were placed

01

sale by J.P. Morgan and Oompany in New York, and indications of
60

Bergmann, History of Reparations, 280.
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suooess "ere 'i!Mlediately apparent. 61
German oredit stabilization, then,

pl~s

the added im-

petus of the Dawes Reparati'on Loan, signalled the beginning of
a long period of intense financial intercourse between the Reic
and Amerioa.

For six years following 1924 immense quantities 0

credit passed from the United States to German interests abroad
Most of' the earlier advances were

~iven

in the form of shortt-

term loans, but as soon as it appeared oertain that German finanoes were not open to further inflation, numerous long-term
contracts were likewise negotiated.
The question now arises as to "hom, speoifioally, did
most of the American money go.

It would be almost impossible,

of oourse, to list individually even the ohief reoipients of
such funds, but a olassification of types of German borrowers
oan easily be given.

There were, in general, four groups who

floated loans outside of Germany: first, the German government
at Berlin; seoond, individual states and munio1pa11ties; third,
\

varioue large 1ndustr1al, commercial, and f1nancial organizations; and finally, innumerable private establishments such as
relig10us groups and small banks. 62

I

,I

il
",1

:1',1
i

61

~.

62 Robert R. Kuczynski, Bankers' Profits from German
Loans, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institute, 1932, 5.
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Surprisingly

of all these four olasses, the

enough~

Republio itself was not the largest reoipient

qt

Amerioan funds,

although it did take a fair share of the total amount loaned
BORROWERS IN
GERMANY

.~

I
:

AMOUNT FLOATED'
IN AMERICA

2

$ 208,250,000

States

11

115,650,000

Provinces, Munioipa11ties

20

103,425,000

Pub11c Util1ty Corporat10ns

41

276,883,000

Industrial
Oorporations

28

214,418,500

Publio Credit
Inst1tutions

19

213,435,000

Private Oommeroial Oorporations

11

94,070,000

Religious Organizations

3

German Republic

!

.---

NUMBER or
LOANS

TOTAL

,

135

12,900,000
$1,239,031,500

out, most of whioh was re-borrowedby private ooncerns in Germany.

On the contrary, the heaviest drain on creditors in this

country came from pub1io utility and industrial corporations
and from institutions of public oredit.

In fact, out of the

one hundred thirty-five separate loan floatations carried on in

131
the United States between 1924 and 1930, seventy';'eight emanated
from one or other of these souroes.

Inoluded among them were

suoh prominent names as Friedrioh
. Krupp, Ltd., August 'rhyssen
Iron and Steel Works, the General Electrio Oompany in Germany,
Saxon Publio Works, the United Steel Works Oorporation, and the
Berlin City Eleotrio Oompany.63
States, munioipalities, and small financial groupb
made up the rest of America's post-war debtors in Germany.

As

the statistioal ohart on the previous page shows,64 at the end
of 1930 olose to one billion two hundred forty million dollars
had been sent across the Atlantio, an amount whioh, not including those loans privately plaoed, oonstituted approximately
seventy per oent of all the Reioh's foreign borrowing during th
past six years. 65 Consequently, it is not surprising to find
that only the largest and most wealthy interests in the United
States were able to handle this tremendous monetary traffic.
These inoluded, in part, J.P. Morgan and Company; the Equitable
\

Trust Oompany; the Ohase National Bank; Dillon, Read, and Oom65

Ibid.;

Kuozynski, Loans, 43-50.

64

Kuczynski, Profits, 5.

65 Angell, 191; Harris, 10. Howland, American ForRelations: 1930, 467, puts the amount at $1,~lO,609,OOO.
Quotes United States Department of Oommeroe, American Underwriting of German Securities, Trade Information Bulletin, No.
~

648.

-

_:
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pany;Goldman, Saohs. and Oompany; Speyer and Oompany;; the Guar-

anty Trust Oompany; Amerioanand Oontinental

co!por~~n;

and

Harris, Forbes and Oompany. 66. .
It might be noted.at this pOint that of all the credits invested in Germany, whether in the Weimar government, the
German states and oities, or in industry or commeroe, no portion was ever given by the United states government as such,
This negative policy by Washington harkened back to the very
early part of the

1920~s,

when a radical change took place in

this oountry's official attitude toward all foreign lending.
In previous years loans had been made with an eye to influencin
the aotions of some foreign power, but now, with American prestige at its highest, such advances were deemed inconsistent
with the oountry's national interests. 67
As a natural result of this program, loans from Ameri
oans -- espeoially from the government itself -- to Germany wer
regarded during this entire post-war deoade in the same hostile
manner by the various departments in the nation's oapital.

In

faot, as early as Maroh, 1922, President Harding asked certain
loan-issuing bankers to submit all their proposed oredit outlay

66

Kuozynski, Loans, 24-26, 43-50.

67 John T. Madden, et al, America's E~erience as a
Oredi tor Nation, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1937,
9.
.- -
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for approval by ,the State Department.

This request was agreed

to by those offioials attending, although a later
protest was
.
~

vOioed by Governor Strong of the New York Federal Reserve
Bank. 68

Nevertheless, with-exception of the Dawes Reparation

Loan of 1924, whioh was personally reoommended by President Co
lidge,69 the offioial Amerioan mind on this matter continued to
remain adamant in its new outlook.

•

Application of this polioy toward the Reich occurred
several times after the Dawes advanoe was completed, notably in
late 1924 when aotual ooncern was expressed by the State Depart
ment over requests for oredit by numerous German states and
cities.

For example, a creditor intending to proceed with a

loan to the state of Bremen was carefully advised to pay specia
attention to Article 248 of the Versailles Treaty which provided for a first mortgage on all German property and lands,70 and
to inquire specifioally into the attitude of the Reich's Financ
Minister whose approval to all such loans was required by a law
of the republic. 71 A year later, in the faoe of still hea~ier
68 William Starr Myers, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover: 1929-1933, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940
189=191; Kuozynski, Loans, 12; Madden, ~ al, 241-242.
69 Calvin Coolidge, Messa~e of the President •.. to th
Congress ••• December ~ 1924, Washing~on;-O.C., U.S. Goverlwen
Printing Office, 1924, 12; James W. Angell, The Financial Foreign Policy of the United States, New York, Council of--fOreign
RelatIon~, 1953:-S5.
70 Foreign Relations, Paris Peace ~., XIII, 530.
71 Madden, et aI, 247-248.
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requests tor funds from abroad, warnings identioal with these
were spread broadcast over the entire American finanoial world

.

by the same authority.

The department also added:

[Make sure that any contemplated] loans are to
be used for productive and self-supporting objects that will improve, directly or indirectly, the economic condition of Germany, and
tend to aid tha~ country in meeting its financial obligations at home and abroad. 72
Exhortations of this kind continued throughout the•
1920's, but if at all, were only moderately effective, for, as
has been shown, over one and a quarter billion dollars were ac-

I

I

corded to German interests by persons in the United States before the and of 1930.

At no time, of oourse, after the Dawes

loan did the government explioitly advise or forbid the advancing of oredits to Germany. Rather, it offered "no Objection u73
to such acts, a policy which led to serious' repercussions again
President Hoover after considerable losses were incurred in the
depression years or 1930 and 1931. 74
As a final note on this subjeot or loans to Germa;ny,
it should be stated that, contrary to some expeotations, the
Weimar government likewise took a firm stand against indiscriminate American financial advanoes to German interests, especial

187.
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Foreign Relations, 1925, II, 177-178.
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11 if those interests happened to be munioipalities whioh sough
to oarry on non-produotive oivio improvements. 75 Thus Gustav

..

Stresemann himself, the Reioh's able Foreign 14ihister during th
,

later 1920's, said of suoh loans:
We need the milliards that have flowed into
our trade and industry in the form of foreign
loans • • • • But only the milliards that are
wholly and solely applied for productive purposes oan be a justifiable addition to our capital, while non-productive foreign loans are
a heavy oharge on our resources' 76
Kuozynski olarifies this pOint even more when he says:
In view of the great ne~d of oapital it was
feared that the municipalities would take undue advantage of the first opportunity offered by the opening of the foreign oapital
market, of aoquiring long-term oredits, and
they would fail to observe that restraint
whioh consideration for the German balance of
payments and consequently for the currency necessitated' 77
Leading German industrialists and finanoiers expresse
this very fear when they announoed that a oontinuation of suoh
loans would be

• eoonomy
disastrous for the future of German
Howland, American Foreise Relations: 1928, 338.
76 Erio Sutton, ed.,-Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries,
Letters, ~ Papers, London, Maomillan and Co., 19~III, 2~.
75

77 Kuozynski, Loans, 5. Quotes Denkschrift llber das
Arbei tsgeb1et ~ die Tatigkei t der Beratungsste'11e, fUr Aus==-iandskredite vom 1. Januar 1925
zum ~O. September 19~ (Pu
lished by tne Reion Finance Minister~.~
----

ore
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and.(wouldJ eventually lead to interterenoe,
on the part of the Transfer Oommittee, .with
t·he Ct]ransfer out of Germany of the interest
oharges .involved.7S
..
In view of this

alar~

and beoause. there was greater

need for loans to industry and agrioulture, Jaoob G. Sohurman,
Amerioan Ambassador to .Berlin, believed that

.

-

the demands of the munioipalities should be
relegated .to the baoksroundj and • .~. that
we [the United states] oan do no better servioe to Germany and ourselves than to disoourage the further plaoing of German municipal loans in America. 79
A year later he notified th~ State Department that
Sohaoht C*]himself ••• is oonvinoed that
to revert to the oomparatively free polioy of
foreign borrowing by publio oorpor.ations [in
Germany] is absolute follY.SO
The Weimar government oonsequently attempted in 1925
to put a ourb on suoh unbridled borrowing, but beoause of a majority laok 1n the Reiohstag, a law requir1ngoffioial approval
for monetary requests abroad was greatly weakened and was there
fore easily evaded. al Nevertheless, while the law was inefteot
ive in some plaoes, it was evidently able to produoe results in
others" for as Wertheimer states:
Almost one-third (31.31%) of the total pub78

Foreign Relations" 1925, II, 173-174.

79
80

~.

81

Ibid., 1925" II, 173-174j Kuozynski, Lonna, 11.

Ibid., 1926, II, 202.

dent of the ReTCh8bank.

*Hjalmar Sohaoht" presi-

:il

i;.'

-

13,7

110 debt of the Federal States and the Hansa
c1t1es on March 31, 1930 had been borrowed
abroad, by far the largest portion having
been raised in the United States. O~ the
other hand, only ten per cent (as of March
31, 1929) of the funds borrowed by the municipalities represented direot foreign loans-82
From 192,4, then, until 1928, German-American relation
revolved, for the most part, around the making of the Dawes Pl
and the extending of United States financial oredits to interests in the Reioh.

Events, however, did not ohange radically i

the next three years, for late in Ootober, 1928, upon the suggestion of S. Gilbert Parker, Agent General for Reparations, a
new oommittee of experts -- inoluding Amerioans -- was called t
give final form to the deoade-old question of the German indemn1ty.

Unoffioially representing America,83 were Owen D. Young,

previously associated with the Dawes Plan, and John Pierpont
Morgan, Amerioan finanoier .Ii!!!:I. exoellenoe alre.ady menti oned in
this work.

Both men were invited by the Reparation Commission

whioh, conjoinlJ with the Reioh government, first obtained ap82 Mildred S. Wertheimer, "Finanoial Crisis in Germany," Foreign Poliol Reports, VIII, Maroh 2, 1932, 459.
83 James T. Gerould, "Amerioa's Part in the Reparations Problem,1I Current Historl, XXIX, Maroh, 1929, 1005-1007.
The author scoffs at the unreality ot' such "unofficial" action.
Says he: "It is hardly to be supposed that durin~! the exte:1ded
conferences that Owen D. Young and Mr. J.P. Morgan had with the
President, Seoretary Kellogg and Secretary Mellon the conversation related exclusively to the weather. 1I The government's avi
interest is also reflected in its mild chastisement of Young af
ter he was unable to stop the European nations' shift of repara
tions responsibility to the United states. Foreign Heluti~,
1929, II, 1059-1062.
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prova1 for this. draf·t from the State Department in Washington. 8 ,
The Young Commission, as the new

gro~y

of experts cam

to be called, deliberated the problem of German reparations fro
.

.

February 11, 1929 to the following June 7.

The discussions, of

course, were international in scope, but in the end the over-al
deOisions oreated a relationship between the United states and
Germany whioh had never existed before.

This ocourred, in part

beoause the German government, in its capaoity as a revived
world power, believed that it oould now expect a whittling down
of reparations payments,85 although in order to accomplish this
desired reduction, it was plain that American creditors would
be forced to cut their demands on the former Alli·es.

The ex-

perts, therefore, were confronted with the task of finding a so
lution to the .conflicting European and American attitudes towar
the relationship of reparations to war debts.
Ever sinoe the Armistioe, the United States had held
to a policy of regarding German reparations payments and the Al
\

lied war debt as two unrelated matters.

As early as June, 1920

Secretary of the Treasury Houston illustrated this viewpoint
84 Foreign Relations, 1929, II, 1027. The State Department, however, was not in favor of Young acting as ohairman of the Experts' Committee. Ibid., 1025.
85

Stolper, 172.
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,

when he wrote to

t~e,

British Ambassador, Sir Aukland Geddes:

It has be'en at all tiimes the view of the United
S'tates Treasury that questions regarding the
indebtedness of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to the United states Government
and the funding of such indebtedness had no relation either to questions arising concerning
the war loans of the United States and of the
United Kingdom to other governments or to questions regarding the reparations payments of the
Central Powers of Europe. S6
•
Again, in the same year President Wilson addressed David Lloyd
George, British, Prime Minister, in these words:
The United States • • • fails to perceive the
logic in a suggestion in effeot either that the
United States shall pay part of Germany's reparation obligation or that it shall make a
gratuity to the Allied Governments to induce them
to fix suoh obligations at an amount within Germany's capaoity to pay. This government has endeavored'heretofore in a most friendly spirit to
make it olear that it oannot consent to connect
the reparation question with lthat of intergovernmental indebtednesseS?
This polioy was carried along by both political parties in America during the entire era of the 1920·s.
ciroles, on the other hand,

ba~

European

consistently held a different

outlook, namely that a very real conneotion existed between Ger
man-Allied and Allied-American post-war finances.

This att1tud

had been made quite clear in the famous Balfour Note of 1922,
S6 Lewis Webster Jones, "American Attitude toward Reparations," The Congressional Digest, VIII, August-September,
1929, 208-20g:87

Ibid.; Foreign Relations, 1929, II, 1059.
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,wherein German reduotions on reparations debts were promised in

.

aooordanoe with any Amerioan olaims whioh were similarly·reduoed against Britain, a polioy later subsoribed to

,

"'"

~'

the,Al-

lied debtors in general.
The importanoe of oonsidering this point in a discussion of German-Amerioan finanoial relations lies in the fact
that through the Young Plan and its annexes, the former Eunopean Allies finally suooeeded in giving tangible expression to
their views in this matter and practioally, if not legally,
shifted the responsibility for a so.lution of the whole repara.tion problem to the United States.

This was aooomplished by

arranging a soheme between themselves and the Germans in which
any of the latter's annuities going to the Reioh's oreditors
would be reduoed by two-thirds of any reduotion granted by Amer
ioa to the Allied debtors before 1965, and by the entire reduction from then until 1988, when suoh annual payments were to
be completed.
j

The Germans were at first loathe to aooept suoh a pro

I
"

I

posal, for not only did they disapprove of oonneoting war debts

i

to reparations,88 but they also believed that this plan would
violate the time limit for reparations payments provided by the
Treaty of Versailles.

Nevertheless, after sufficient Allied

pressure, they submitted, for as Dr. Schacht himself said:
88

~.,

1928, II, 871.
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All representations on the part of the,German experts that Germany had nothing in the
world to do with the Allied debts broke down
on the arbitrary politioal attitude of the
other· S9
The Concurrent Memorandum, as the above agreement was
named 6 was an annex to the .Young Plan,90 signed by the former
$

Allies and the Germans 6 but not by the Amerioan experts. By it
the dootrine of the Balfour Note was Europeanized, and if the
Germans ever wanted to reduoe their debt6 they were thenceforth
obliged to first persuade the United States to reduoe its olaims
on the rest of Europe.

Moreover, in order to keep the question

open as a German-American affair 6 the European oreditors so arranged it that that part of the reparations subjeot to postponement and immune from commeroialization beoame almost identical
with that o·f Europe's debts with Amerioa.
thirty-seven years such

Thus, for the next

noutp~yments"by Ge~any

were intended t

oorrespond to an amount equal to reparations
after 1965 to parallel war debts only.

This soheme, of oourse,

maneuvered Amerioa into suoh a position as to make her the only
recipient -- and therefore the only colleotor -- of the Reich's
89 Howland, American Foreign Relations, 1930, 453.
Quotes speeoh by Schaoht before the Deutsche Industrie und !!E:!ldlestag, Munioh, June 2S, 1929.
90 Leon Fraser, "The Reparation Settlement Signed
June 7, 1929, II International Conci11ation, No. 253, Ootooel',
1929, 517-520.
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reparat10n dues after 1965. 91
Another aspeot of the Young Plan wh;oh d1reotly involved Amerioa and Germany found 1ts bas1s 1n a general fear

.

that, without a reduotion of United States olaims against the
Weimar state similar to those offered by the ex-allies, the Experts' Commission would fail.

The Amerioan government was con-

sequently faoed with the problem of either lessening the amount
of its M1xed Claims Awards whioh were direot payments due indiv
idual Amerioan oitizens, or outting its b1ll for Army of Ocoupa
tion oosts 1n the Rhineland. 92 The latter oourse was deoided
upon at a White House oonferenoe in mid-May, 1929, where both
the President and ohief members of Congress agreed to a soaling
down of army oosts by ten per oent of the original amount and t
extend the term of payment. 93 The whole reduotion totaled only
about thirty million dollars, but it served to insure the final
success of the Young Conferenoe.

This personal move on the par

II'
II:

I

of President Hoover was charaoterized by the Nation as being a
step away from the
old, obstinate, intransigent posit10n of refusing to do anything 1n the matter of repara:1"

91 E.L. Bogart, "Our Interest in the Reparations Pro'\- lem," Atlantio Monthly, Boston and New York, The Atlantic Month
ly Co., OXLV, April, 1930, 555-561.
92

Foreign Relations, 1929, II, 1047.

93

~.,

1075-1082.
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tions ••.• Had this oountry shown a willingness to cut its demands (earlier], the reparations issue would have been settled long ago •.
• • • Amerioa has no more important duty than
to speed that se~tlement in every possible waY-94
Finally, it might-be emphasized again that, like its
view of the Dawes Plan, official American attitude toward the
Young agreements was one of coolness, reserve, and at times,
near-opposition.

No authorized American representatives attend

ed the conference sessions, nor did the United states subscribe
to the principles upon which the new plan was based.

For in-

stance, when the Bank for International Settlement was proposed
in 1929, Secretary' of State Stimson refused to IIpermit any offi
cials of the Federal Reserve System either to serve themselves
or select American representatives" for the proposed financial
concern.

Said he:
Wliile we look with interest and sympathy upon
the efforts being made by the committee of experts to suggest a solution and settlement.of
the vexing question of German reparation, this
government does not desire to have any American
official, directly or indireotly, participate
in the collection of German reparations through
the agenoy of a bank or otherwise. SS
Similarly, in referenoe to the entire Young Plan,

President Hoover announoed in June, 1929:
94 "Amerioa Acta at Last," Nation, May 29, 1929,
CXXVIII, 637.
95
1071.

Jones, 208-209;

Foreign Relations, 1929, II,
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Our government is not a party to that agreement and therefore would not be a signatory to
it. There is no oooasion to submit the agreement to Congress.96
. ~
As a final note, then, it might be said that the
Young Plan was acoepted and ratified by the European powers, in
oluding Germany, in the early part of 1930.

The United States,

however, adamantly retained its offioial aloofness, although

•
later that same year it did swallow it,s pride enough to negotiate for a private settlement of the German-American Mixed Claim
question along the very lines set up by Young and his associates. 97
Ultimately, of

course~

the deoisions of both sides

concerning the reparations issue came to nought, for the depres
sion which had begun some months earlier in the Stock Exchange

.

on Wall Street now struok Germany with all the ferocity of a
Caribbean hurr'ioane.

It left in its wake a trail of cred! t

withdrawals,98 unemployment, and mass discontent.
I,

Over three

million Germans could not find work enough to earn their liveli
hood, and the total was rising eaoh day.

Rioters and demagogue

captured the ears of the German people, so that by m1d-1930,
they were willing to try anything in order to rise from the
chaos. 99
96 Jones, 208-209.
97 Foreign Relations, 1930, III, 106-109.
98 Ibid., 89.
99 Ibid., 76.
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In September of that year, then, appeared the first

.

ominous indication . that the end of the Weimar Republic was soon
to be at hand, for in nation-wide eleotions for members of the

.

Reichstag, Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist party polled
approximately six and one-half million iotes to rise from twe1v
to a total of one hundred seven seats in that body.

By this on

gigantio sweep, the Nazis became the second largest party in
the Reich, and immediately began pressing for extensive. posts
in the machinery of the Weimar government. 100
Reports of-Hitler's triumph were immediately sent by
the ChargedlAffaires in Germany, George A. Gordon, to the Secretary of state.

Gordon informed Stimson of the plight of the

German people and charaoterized their action at the polls as
giving "support to a party whose leader and promises are irresponsible," and whose oampaign for votes was "extraordinarily
confused, selt-oontradictory, and opportunist" in nature. 10l
Said he further of the Reioh populace:
[lIt is doubly unfortunate that the more intelligent oitizens who were induoed to vote
the National Socialist ticket could not • • •
realize that in thus voting they were taking
the surest steps to inorease the diffioulties
of government, to further impair foreign confidence -- espeoially in finanoial circles -100

~.,

76.

101

~.,

76-77.

!"
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in the stability of German republioan institutions, and in general, to intensify the eoonomio and finanoial evils of whioh they oomplain.
However, they apparently thought neither of this
nor of anything else of that nature. When over
six million voters follow a party whioh promises
"freedom and brea.d" without any indication as to
how e·i ther is going to be provided, certainly
the least that can be said is that such voters
are in a very reckless frame of mind. lOa
Reports concerning the Nazis themselves were far from

•

oomplimentary, for Gordon oited their use of Semitism, international banks, the Young Plan, and the Treaty of Versailles as
artioles of propaganda against the Weimar government.

Above

all, he oalled attention to their 'remedy" of "repudiation pure
and simple of any suoh written obligations, and a march on Ber-

!
I

i

lin, for the purpose of establishing.a reaotionary dictatorship • • • 0 103 Ooncerning a representative of the Nazi party, a

.,!

oertain Herr Schiokdanz, WhO visited him on the very day after
the election, the oharge remarked:
When trying to expound his party's program of
"freedom and bread," Mr. Sohiokdanz could get
no further than to repeat that the payment of
tribute by Germany must oease and that as a
oorrolary the theory of German war guilt, as
embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, must be
formally repudiated • • • • Just how this party proposes to aohieve this "freodom," however,
and in what manner it envisages oonverti~ this
achievement, if aocorllpliehed, into Buch a remedy for the fundamental economic ills with which

loa

~.,

103

Ibid., 77-78.

78.
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Germany is beset, as to fulfill the prOm1se
of "bread", he made no attempt to 1nd1oate.104

..

All in all, then, Amerioa's offioial impress10ns of
National Sooia11sm and its leader were, from the very start,
suspioious and distrustful.,

Yet, they were not entirely with-

out hope, for as Gordon, with almost unoanny insight, put it:
Danger is olearly there, and oannot lightly be
overlooked or explained away • • • ; but yet a
way remains open for all sinoere supporters of
the Republio to make oommon oause against .this
danger. If at suoh a junoture as this they fail
to sink their personal and dootrinal differenoes,
then indeed a serious situation will present itself_lOS

104

Ibid., 82.

105

.reg., 79.

CHAPTER V
CONOLUSION
The investigation just presented has been the product of extensive, though not exhaustive, research into a great

•

number of souroes having referenoe to America and Germany during the period of the Weimar Republic.

The facts reoordedare,

of oourse, only the faots which have proved themselves available, and therefore it is quite possible that some errors of
omission or interpretation have crept into the text.

Relying,

then, solely upon the information which has been gathered, and
reoognizing the ohanoe of misjudgment, the following conclusions seem to be warranted by the material at hand.
In the first plaoe, it is quite olear that the Weimar era provided for both Germans and Amerioans a genuine oppor
tunity for a needed rapprochement after half a oentury of
tagonism and open confliot.

~

This ohanoe for renewed friend-

ship, it seems, was used to a muoh greater extent than is generally understood, for while the prooess was slow and progress
intermittent, a distinotly different attitude could definitely
be found existing between these peoples in
prevailed a decade earlier.
148

19~O

from that which

149
In support of the above observation, the view of the

.

American publio toward the question of German war guilt in 1919
oan be oontrasted with the feel1ng,wh1oh prevailed at the time
of the Young Plan, and even-the government's outlook on food fer
the Reich after the war oan be oompared to its later view on
oooupational army oosts.

The merohants and bankers, of oourse,

did business for business' sake, but even among these the inorease of 1nteroourse from 1920 to 1930 shows a gradual growth
in trust and oonfidenoe between the two former foes.

Finally,

it might be added that some elements of both nationalities forgot their differenoes immediately after the armistioe, as did
the nutritional experts and suoh humane organizations as the
Friends and others.
Surprisingly enough, the souroes of friotion whioh
troubled the Reioh and Amerioa during the 1920's were oomparatively few in number.

Probably the one most dreaded was that

of possible German-Amerioan oommeroial competition, but though
it was expeoted by large numbers, it never quite materialized.
Similarly, tariff wars were oonspiouously absent, and despite
the oomplaints of Amerioan oustoms injust1oe, no real oonfliot
ever developed during the Weimar period.
The aloofness and inaotivity of Washington, both 1n
the reparations' struggle and in finanoial matters, must, of
oourse, be admitted.

Yet, even this was not directed only to-
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ward Germany, but

r~ther

was extended alike toward all things

foreign under the traditional polioy of non-intervention and

..

political isolation.
tude was quite often
individuals~high

leading

~oles

The faots, however, show that this attinon-exis~ent

exoept in name, for American

in power and experienced in world affairs took

in almost all important foreign activities, thougb

in an "unoffioial" capaoi ty.

Again, where America IS advant.age

was to be seoured -- as in the Berlin Paot -- there was no hesitanoy on the part of the United
States government to negotiate
,
openly with the Germans, and its magnan1mouspo11cy toward the
return of alien property is oertainly to be acoorded a high degree of praise.
All in all, then, this study of American relations
with the. Weimar Republio presents not only an interesting oontrast to any similar review of interoourse with the Reioh eithel
before or after the period between 1919 and

19~O,

but also of-

fers some valuable guidanoe for ourrent Amerioan aotion.

In a

day when oitizens of this oountry are again faoed with the'task
of re-orienting their views and polioies

tow~

the German na-

tion and people, this report serves a very real purpose in showing what can be aocomplished when peaoe, oo-operation, and harmony are substituted for distrust, olash of ideologies, and
open warfare.

And what has been done in the past can again be

done in the future.

..
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New York" Oxford UniversIty Press, XIrI, 1919, 85-96.-;-This article is oonstituted mainly of diplomatic dispatohes exohanged between the Amerioan and German governments in the oritical days before November 11, 1918.
Amerioan pressure for an ouster of the Kaiser's regime
is clearly shown forth in these notes.
Curt1, Merle E., "John C. Calhoun and the Un1fioat1on of Germany," Amer10an Historioal Review, New York, The Maomillan Co., XL, 1935, 476-478.
The text of this reference oontains a letter written by
Calhoun during the uneasy days of the German revolution
of 1848-1849. The future vioe-president herein shows a
favorable attitude toward the Germans, but oritioises
their government as being too unstable.
rraser, Leon, "The ,Reparation Settlement Signed June 7, 1929,D
International Cono1l1ation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peaoe, No. 253, Ootober" 1929, 4~1-52l.
Mr. Fraser, an advisor to the Young Committee, here gives
the full text of the oomm1ttee's proposal for solving the
reparations question, and also presents an interesting
oommentary on this same agreement. The annexes to the
plan are also provided.
Hughes, Charles Evans, The pathwa~ to Peaoe, New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 19 5.
Contained in this work are representative addresses delivered by Hughes during his term as Secretary of state from
1921 to 1925. A great number of the talks are devoted to
foreign policy and were thus valuable to this thesis.
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Moore, John Bassett', A Digest of International Law, B vols.,
Washington, D:.o'.7 United States Government Printing Offioe, House Dooument 551, 56th Oongress, .~nd Session.
,

~

As a professor of international law and diplomaoy at Columbia University, and also one-time Assistant Seoretary
of State of the United States, Moore is well-qualified to
present the intrioaoies of law among nations. This 001leotion of doouments is pertinent to all phases of "this
subjeot, and is therefore a very valuable although outdated work.

.

i

~i

Myers, William Starr, (ed.), ~ State Papers and Other Publio
Writings of Herbert Hoover, a vols., Garden City, New
York, DouOleday, Doran and Co., 1934.
.
These two volumes of the oolleoted papers of Hoover during
his term as President of the United States are edited by
an experienoed professor of politios at Prinoeton University. The work oontains suoh items as press dispatches,
messages to Congress, letters, proolamations, and the like.
Papers Relating to the Forei~ Relations of the United States:
1919-1930, ~'vors., Was ington,D.C.:-Tne-Department of
State, United States Government Printing Offioe, 1934-1945.

!II'II

In the writer's estimation, this set of volumes is probably the one most valuable aid that oame to be used in the
writing of this thesis. Only those editions referring to
the above-stated years are inoluded in this reference, but
all important ,diplomatio oommunioations arising between
the Amerioan government and that of any major foreign power from the end of the Civil War to 1933 oan be looated in
these exoellent publioations. All are easy to work with
and are overflowing with primary souroe material.
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I

:II'j

lil,l
I'

iii,'I

Papers Helating .12. ~ Foreign Relations of the United states:
1919, The Paris Peaoe Conferenoe, 13 vols., Washington,
D.C., unIted States Government Printing Office, 1947.
This set of works is a supplement to the regularly issued
Foreign Relations referred to above. Volumes I to XII
oontain all negotiations of import involving the United
states delegates to Versailles, while Volume XIII sets
out in full the text of the Paris Treaty. Especially helpful are the editor's notes which explain and give historioal signifioanoe of eaoh article of the pact, inoluding
ramifioations as late as World War II.

"

,
,

.
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.

Scott, James Brown, The Treaties of 1785, 1799, and 1828 between the Unitea-states and-Pruss1a, New York, Oxfora
UniverSIty Press, 1918. --•

.

Th1s volume conta1ns the treaty texts referring.to the
first commercial pacts negot1ated between the Un1ted
States and the Prussia of Freder1ck the Great. Notes
and commentar1es are lack1ng, but the work is an invaluable aid to accurate quotations from and original
wording of the pacts 1n question.
St1mson, Henry L. and Bundy, McGeorge, On Act1ve Serv1ce 1n
Peace and War, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1948.~
.................

--

Here St1mson presents, 1n one volume, h1s chief memoirs
of almost a half-century of public service, twice as
Secretary of War and once as Secretary of State of the
United States. The account, written as recently as 1947,
makes 1nterest1ng reading and seems quite reliable in
its 1nforma1;ion.
Surface, Frank M. and Bland, Raymond L., American Food in the
World War and Reconstruct1on Per1od, Stanfor~1versity,
California, 1Sstanford University Press, 1931.

I

Ii

Actually a sem1-primary source, this account contains so
much of accurate stat1st1cal data regard1ng Amer1can aid
to Europe in the post-war era, that to place it in the
secondary category would be to do a real injustice. The
authors have performed an excellent service 1n compiling
th1s l1st 'of amounts, pr1ces, and d1str1bution pOints,
and a more comprehens1ve, yet manageable work on this
subj ect probably canno1i be found.
Sutton, Erio, (ed.), Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries, Letters,
~ Papers, 3 vols., Lonaon, The Macm1llan bo., 1940.
Mr. Sutton here1n presents three volumes of the most important papers issued by Stresemann in h1s years as a
public servant for the Weimar govel.'nment. Or iginully in
German, these works have been taken from the edition published in 1932 and 1934 by the Foreign MiniottJr t S pI'i vate
secretary, Henry Bernhard, and aloe thUG reliable and
trustworthy.
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.

Angell, James W., Ih! Recovery £! GermanI, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1929.
The author, an associate professor of economics in Columbia University, herein presents a detailed account of
Germany's sudden recuperation after the chaos of 1923.
Chapters are excellent on German loans, business and labor, and on both the Dawes and Young Plans for reparations. Useful appendices , are also included.

:1

,

,i
"

I
"

Arnold, T.W., German Ambitions as T~ey Affect Britain and ~
United States of America, Eaw ork, G.P. Putnam1s Sons,
and Smith, Elder and Co., 1903 •.
Arnold's one-volume work presents a rather over-done record of German .oolonial and oommercial aims at the turn of
the oentury. If used with disoretion, however, the book
has its good pOints, especially in reference to German
activities in the Caribbean Sea during this time.
Bailey, Thomas A., Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, New
York, The Macmillan Co., 1945:----Interesting, though plainly pr~Wilsonian, this book records the gigantio struggle between this former president
and the American Senate over the Versailles Peace Treaty
after its submission to that body for approval. Bailey's
sources are exceptionally well-chosen, nevertheless, ,and
from the standpoint of publio opinion, the work is a
worthy one.
.
Bailey, Thomas A., Woodrow Wileon and the Lost Peace, New York,
The Macmillan Co., 1944.
.
This work is the original project to which the previousmentioned volume is a sequal, and thus covers that pOI'tion
of the years 1918 and 1919 during which the Versailles
Peace Conference was actually in session. '!'he \vhole of
Wilson's battle with the Allied leaders in drrunatically
portrayed, although again from the vantage point of a Wileon enthusiaet.
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1

I
I
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Battle-Monuments Oommission, American Armies and Battlefields
in Europe, Washington, D.C., united States Government
Printing Office, 1938.
~
Most of the information contained in this work is irrelavent to the subject at hand, but the book contains. a
fine summary'of the activities of the American occupation
forces in Germany between 1918 and 1923. A useful map,
picturing. the United States zone of operation, is also
included. It is reproduced in this thesis on Pg. 44.
Bemis, Samuel Flagg, A Diplomatio History£!
New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1936.

~

'

United States,
•

In Samuel F. Bemis the world of diplomatic historians has
found a most erudite scholar. Therefore, even in this
general work, oovering Amerioan foreign relations from
the nation's inception to· the post-World War era, muoh
valuable material oan be found. The author 1 s souroes are
varied and dependable, as well as his suggestions for
deeper researoh.
Bemis, Samuel Flagg, (ed.), American Seoretaries of state and
Their Diplomaoy, 10 vols., New York, A. KnopI; 1928. --Here is a ten volume set oovering the signifioant diplomatic aotivities of all the American Seoretaries of State
from Jefferson to Hughes. As might be expeoted, these
works refleot the same high quality and soholarship that
Bemis shows in all his writings on this subjeot.
Bergmann, Oarl, The Histor~ 2! ReEarations, Boston and New York,
Houghton Mifflin and 0., 19 7.
As a member of the Reparations Commission from the Weimar
Republio, Mr. Bergmann oan well be expeoted to know his
sUbject, although a somewhat pro-German Viewpoint is presented. The book is useful in this capaCity, but since
it carries the subjeot merely to the year 1927, it cannot
'be depended upon for a complete aocount 01' the reparations
question.
Brooks, Sidney, America ~ Germany: 1918-1925, New York, The
Macmillan Co., 1925.
Tne central tneme of this work is the great nutritional
contribution 0:1:' Americans, led by Herbert Hoover, to the
starving masses of Germany during the first half-decade
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, after the World War. The book is quite detailed and contains many seleotions from contemporary reports, both offioial and unofficial.
.. '
Carroll, E. Malcomb, Germany ani ~ Great Powers: 1866-1914,
New York, Prentice-Hall, I 0., 1938. '
American relations with the Imperial German government
prior to the Great War are covered with scholarly accuracy in Mr. Carroll's work. 'The author, a. professor'of
history at Duke University, manages to weave in a noticeable amount of interpretation, however, for the work is
primarily a compilation of public opinion as recorde~ in
newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets of the day. Nevertheless, the primary sources used by the author cannot
be matohed.
Ergang, Robert, EuroEe
Co., 1949.

~~

Time, New York, D.O. Heath and

Ergang,t s 1s a general text useful in the main for gaining
an over-all picture of the decade in question. It is a
very reoent work, and therefore more able to present views
based on ourrent research than a souroe written in the
heat of action during the 1920's themselves. A good bibliography is also included.
'inoh, George A., "The Treaty of Peaoe with Germany in the
Uni ted States Senate, II International Oonoilia tion, New
York, Amerioan Assooiation for International Conciliation,
No. 153, August, 1920, passim.
Finch treats in a shorter form the same subject that Bailey takes up in his second book on Wilson. The presentation 1s very soholarly and uses many excerpts from contemporary speeches in the Congress,. Pub11 shed 1n 1920, however, 1t tends to refleot the views of that era, and there
fore 1s not as useful as it ordinarily might seem.
Gazley, John Gerow, American Opinion of German Unifica~~~n:
1848-1871, New York, OOlumbia University Press, 1926.
This produot of Gazley's has high merit as an impartial in
vestigation of American thought on tlle subject of German
unification through the Franco-Pl'ussian War. Newspapers
from allover the United states are quoted, as well as innmaerable periodicals, letters, and personal works of prom
inent influentials.
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Greene, George Washington, The German Element in the War of
Amerioan Independenoe,-rew York, Hurd andhoughtO'ii'; 1876 •

..

This is an aooount of that portion of the Amerioan populaoe of German desoent and immigration in the struggle
for independenoe. The 'book was used herein as a souroe
of information of General von Steuben, but it is useful
also in building up an understanding of Amerioan friendship with Germany through its foreign-born population.
Barris, Oharles R.S., Germany's Foreign Indebtedness, London,
Oxford University Press, 1935.

•

In this work an English dootor of philosophy presents a
well-detailed aooount of German debts contracted with foreigners from 1924 to date. Muoh of the material is given
in graphio form or in statistical charts where America's
share of oredits to the Reich during this period can easily be determined.
Hazen, Oharles Downer, Modern Europe, New York, Henry Holt and
00., 1926.
Hazen's summary is merely'a general history of Europe sinc
Waterloo, but it nt.s useful for details ot' over-all chronology, especially as baokground for the problem at hand.
The work is remarkably detailed for.its scope.
Hepner, Adolf, Amerioa's Aid to Germany in 1870 and 1871, St.
Louis, Missouri, no publISher given;-190S. --Hepner does a fine job of writing an aooount of the little
known relationship whioh existed between the German and
American nations through United States management of ' the
Reich's embassy in P~ris during the Franoo-Prussian struggle. The work is praotioally a biography of America's
Elihu B. Washburne, then ambassador to France, during the
years 1870 and 1871.
Howland! Oharles P., Survey of American Foreign Re1ati 2..1~S_: 1~:??.
1931, 4 vols., New Haven, 'Yale University Pl'eos, 1~j:";8-1~J01..
Here is an exbeeding1y helpful publication issued by the
Council on Foreign Relations. Every important aspect of
the foreign policy 01' the United States during a specific
year is orderly and comprehensively covered. Very excellen
for establishing continuity between widely spaced events.
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Huddle, Frank P., "Enemy Property," Editorial Research Reports,
II, July 7, 1945."

..

The author of" this pamphlet offers a brief, but adequate,
account of the entire alien property question which raged
so fiercely throughout the dedade of the 1920's. Summaries of debts retained and paid are a vital part of this
report and an interesti~g comparison to a similar situation during World War II is included.
Masterman, SylVia, The Origins of International Rivalry in
Samoa: 1854-1884; London) IIlen and Unwin, 1934.
--

•

Originally written as a doctoral dissertation, Miss Master
man's coverage of her subject is only fairly comprehensive.
Not only does it carry the subject no further than 1884,
but also many incidents are merely touched upon or entirely excluded. As a corroborative source, the work is useful, but not as a source for anything greater than that.
Ryden, George H., The Foreign POliC, of the United States in
Relation ~ Samoa, New~aven, aIeunlversity Press, !933.
" In contrast to that of Sylvia Masterman, this account of
samoan-American affairs is by far the better. It is more
comprehensive, contains many more varied sources, and continues the subject to its logical end in 1899. In this
writer's opinion the book may be relied upon for a full
and acourate record of its theme.
Sto1berg-Wernigerode, Otto zu, Germany and the United States of
America during the Era of Bismarck, ReidI'ng, Pennsylvania;Henry Janssen Foundation; 1937.
As a work with much deep insight into German-American affairs in the late 19th century, this presentation can hard
ly be equalled. The author uses much material from both
American and German archives. Nevert heless, this \vork has
a tinge of pro-Germanism, especially in its treatment of
Bismarck.
Stolper, Gustav, German Eoonomy: 1870-1940,
and Hitohcock, 1940.
"

~ew

York, Reynal

This author presents a bird's-eye view of the eoonomy of
Germany during the last days ot" tne Empire, during the entire Weimar era, and during most of the Hitler regime. No
one section is burdened with details, but rather offers a

I
I

~---------------------------------------------------,I

leo
. olear-cut picture of the fast moving events which revolved
around the changeable German soene.
Townsend~ Mary E., The Rise and Fall of Germany'S Colonial Em-

pire: l884-l91s:-New York; The Macmillan Co., 1930.

--

Drawn almost entirely· from first-hand souroes, this work
by an assistant professor of history at Columbia University contains muoh insight into the era of German oolonization. Miss Townsend·' s book also correots a number of
misoonoeptions conoerning German 0010nia1 praotioes whioh
arose out of World War I propaganda.
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